Jiang Daohua(1.National Research Centre for Foreign Language Education　Beijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing　100089;2.Hefei Normal University,Hefei　Anhui　230601)



Later Wittgenstein’s Rule-following Paradox and Chinese Philosophy of Meaning

Jiang Daohua1,2
(1.National Research Centre for Foreign Language EducationBeijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing100089;2.Hefei Normal University,HefeiAnhui230601)

Rule-following paradox in Philosophical Investigations remains a hot philosophical issue through which Wittgenstein promotes its intimate association with such core concepts like language games,meaning-is-use and private language.This paradoxical way of explicating meaning is echoed in Chinese traditional philosophy.This paper discusses how Wittgenstein’s puzzle of meaning is touched upon and dissolved by Chinese traditional philosophy well expressed in Zhuangzi’s On the Uniformity of All Things (齐物论),Sengzhao’s Immovability of Thing (物不迁),and Gongsun Long’s White Horse Dialogue (白马论),which all highlight determinacy in the indeterminacy of meaning.

rule-following paradox;Chinese philosophy;language games;indeterminacy of meaning

This paper,based on Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following paradox,explores its genesis,analysis and dissolution,unravelling later Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideology against mind-based model of meaning.The mind-based model of meaning holds the view that meaning of words has something in mind rather than the mere way of use.Wittgenstein,however,radically repudiates this model through rule-following paradox,and further defends his thoughts of “meaning-is-use” in language-games.

Ⅰ.Mind-based model of meaning

The main thrust of Rule-following Paradox is based on the ways of following rules in understanding language,that is,the ways of interpreting the meaning of expressions.In its secular sense,the notion of following a rule is the practice in which understanding the meaning of expressions is to observe the rules for their use in different language-games they belong to.〔1〕

At its very beginning,Philosophical Investigations quotes an extract taken from St.Augustine’s Confessions (AD397-400) on ostensive definition of meaning,which is harshly repudiated by Wittgenstein.He thinks that Augustine only explicates words and their referents in terms of communication system without encompassing all aspects of language activities,that is,Augustine’s concepts of meaning are solely applicable to special naming activities of language-games,but invalid to the much broader language-games in that understanding the meaning of names is not in accordance with understanding the use of names.For example,knowing the names of all chessmen does not mean knowing the ways of moving the chessmen.Based on the critique against St.Augustine’s traditional referential meaning of words,Wittgenstein introduces his brand-new contention of meaning-is-use.

Through his critical review,Wittgenstein gradually builds up his concepts of language-is-use:the expressions of meaning are the activities of following certain rules,which are deeply rooted into form of life.The notion of use is central to Wittgenstein’s accounts of what it is for a word to have meaning,of what is involved in learning the meaning of a word,and of what counts as having understand the meaning of a word.〔2〕Now that the meanings of words and sentences dwell in their use,it is imperative to understand the rules which the uses of words and sentences are following,that is,the rules of language-games.Any kind of games must follow certain rules,so do language-games.To be specific,the use and various formations of words in different contexts are following certain rules,which in turn also stipulate the use of words and concomitantly circumscribe the meanings of words and sentences.

There is emerging a counterargument against Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning-is-use,that is,language users must have something inner,or “come before our minds” or embody “a mental process”〔3〕when they understand the words.The meaning of words is not just their use,but rather has something in mental state,having “mental reality”.It is very likely for a language user to use a word correctly but without knowing exactly what the word means.

The aforementioned Mind-based Model of Meaning in explaining the meaning of a word seems to be very convincing in that the correct use of a word is certainly different from understanding of a word:mimicking the use of a word by others may not guarantee the right understanding of it.Just like a computer programming,it is only programmers who can design a programme to put different nouns,verbs,adjectives or adverbs in forming meaningful sentences while computer itself can only process the combination of words but know nothing of the meaning of words and sentences.Language users,to a certain degree,can be in a state of computer-like programming.Conversely,it can readily come to the conclusion that there must be a certain mental representation when language users understand the meaning of words and sentences,that is,“understanding the meaning of a word involves having this meaning in one’s mind”,〔4〕which is the essential difference from computer programming of words.Thus,Mind-based Model of Meaning proposes that the meaning of a word is not the use this word has in language,but the rule that governs this use — what is more,this rule is essentially something in the mind,it is something mental.

Ⅱ.Argument of rule-following paradox

With the purpose of countering Mind-based Model of meaning,Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations explicates in the minute way the mental process of following rules,in which game of chess (§200),the well-known metaphor,is used to depict that understanding the meaning of a word is to understand correctly a series of “moves” in language-games,which merely stems from their use rather than mental representation or “mental signs”.〔5〕

The misunderstanding of word meaning from the perspective of Mind-based Model of meaning,in Wittgenstein’s sense,can be analyzed mainly through two layers in discussions of the correlation among rule,meaning and mind.

1.Non-determinacy of rule

In Wittgenstein’s views,language is games,in which rule-following is obligatory.But “is there not also the case where we play and — make up the rules as we go along?And there is even one where we alter them — as we go along” (§83).That is to say,all games do not have some certainty universal but family resemblance in that some games are determined by rules and some other are not.It is the same case with language-games that “the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules” (§84).

In Wittgenstein’s views,there is no universal rule which can be utilized to cover all possible scenarios in the use of the word chair.Therefore,simply understanding meaning as mental signs is misguiding,disregarding the indeterminacy of word use,that is,the use of a word can accord with a rule or contradict a rule.

2.Infinity of rule

Wittgenstein thinks that even language-games are circumscribed by rules,the meaning of rules is definitively not mental signs.According to the mind-based model of rule-following,it is only counted as having understood the meaning of “to add” if a certain rule is present before the mind.To be more specific,it is only counted as having understood the meaning of “to add” if there is,before the mind,a mental sign that describes all of the ways in which this expression is used.

To Wittgenstein,this mind-based model of rule-following is profoundly unqualified,the main problem of which comes from the fact that the model equates understanding or grasping a rule with attending to a mental sign.〔6〕In Wittgenstein’s understanding,mind-based model misrecognizes rule-following as searching for the right explanation of rule signs.This searching for understanding a rule becomes primarily about “hit on the correct interpretation” of a sign.This leads to an infinite regress:understanding any given rule requires understanding an infinite series of other rules.〔7〕The natural conclusion would be something like this:no course of action could be determined by a rule,because any course of action can be made out to accord with a rule;if any action can be made out to accord with the rule,then it can be made out to conflict with it.〔8〕This is rule-following paradox.

Ⅲ.Dissolution of rule-following paradox by Chinese philosophy of meaning

Although his philosophical meditation has tapped into the commonsensical nature of meaning in our language use,Wittgenstein himself does not present his definite dissolution of this rule-following paradox.Later,many western philosophers,such as Saul Kripke,〔9〕have being cudgeling their brains to dissolve it through various means.If it is put into Chinese philosophical context,this paradox has been delved into in great length and even dissolved in a philosophical way.This discussion can be traced back to such philosophical ideology expressed in Zhuangzi’s On the Uniformity of All Things (齐物论),Sengzhao’s Immovability of Thing (物不迁),and Gongsun Long’s White Horse Dialogue (白马论),which all highlight the paradoxical understanding towards meaning of language use and their the dissolution in the idea of “determinacy in the indeterminacy of meaning”.

1.Rule-following paradox in Chinese philosophical way of thinking

In rule-following paradox,Wittgenstein thinks that rules are not private,not mental representation.Otherwise,following rules will be doomed into irresolvable dilemma.In On the Uniformity of All Things,Zhuangzi,much earlier than Wittgenstein,extends this paradoxical rule-following to a much broader perspective,focusing on how we comprehend the world,including language that is used in our daily life.

Another very influential philosophizing of the paradox of meaning comes from Gongsun Long,a logician in ancient Chinese philosophy.In his White Horse Dialogue,the statement of “white horses are not horses” severely contradicts our commonsensical understanding of reality,but paradoxically points out the relationship between naming and thing.

2.Chinese philosophical way of dissolving Wittgenstein’s paradox

In terms of Wittgenstein’s point,dissolution of rule-following paradox must be put into community in that without a communitarian norm reference,it will be indeterminate to observing whether a rule is being followed.Similarly,in On the Uniformity of All Things,Immovability of Thing and White Horse Dialogue (白马论),the way of dissolving the paradox must be approached from the superficiality to the essentiality,highlighting determinacy in the indeterminacy of meaning.For Wittgenstein,rule-following paradox can be resolved by language games,in which meaning is its use.For Shengzhao and Gongsun Long,they view the commonsensical paradox as a camouflage of interpretation of meaning,through which we can obtain the vision of reality.

However,the ultimate purposes of dissolving the rule-following paradox among the four great philosophers are different.For Wittgenstein and Zhuangzi,dissolving the paradox is to help them disconnect from the traditional ideology.For Wittgenstein,he tries to separate his later philosophy from his former one.For Zhuangzi,he tries to defend his own ideology from other schools’ at that time.For Shengzhao and Gongsun Long,they appeal more to the ideal than the secular meanings of language in use,just like the former Wittgenstein’s logical philosophy.

Ⅳ.Conclusion

In dissolving rule-following paradox to further nullify mind-based model of meaning,Wittgenstein first presumes that rules have something in mental representation,that is,meaning does have some rules in “private”.However,how can we justify a person consistently follow the same rules in the past,the present and the future?〔10〕Definitely,we cannot.Therefore,meanings of words are the assemblage of all language-games,engrained in the infinitum of human-beings’ social activities.Likewise,in Chinese traditional philosophy,Wittgenstein’s way of argumentation has been well touched upon for a long time at a much broader level,highlighting determinacy in the indeterminacy of meaning.This paper argues that Chinese traditional philosophy can be a solver from many knotted western philosophical issues,rule-following paradox being a typical example.

References:

〔1〕Grayling,A.,Wittgenstein,A Very Short Introduction,Oxford University Press,2001,pp.89,93.

〔2〕〔4〕〔5〕〔6〕〔7〕Tejador,C.,Starting with Wittgenstein,London:Continuum,2011,pp.130,135,136,139,142,143,143.

〔3〕Wittgenstein,L.,Philosophical Investigation (4th),Wiley-Blackwell,2009年,第140,154,217,218节。

〔8〕Lee,B.,Philosophy of Language:The Key Thinkers,Continuum International Publishing Group,2011,pp.128,131.

〔9〕Kripke,S.,Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,Harvard University Press,1982.

〔10〕陈嘉映：《语言哲学》，北京大学出版社，2003年，第275页。

About the author：Jiang Daohua,PhD candidate of National Research Centre for Foreign Language Education of Beijing Foreign Studies University,lecturer of Hefei Normal University.