杨森 钱吴永

摘  要：研究消费者具有扶贫偏好时，制造商与零售商做出扶贫努力的二级供应链，探究制造商向做出扶贫宣传投资的零售商提供不同的契约协调时供应链的均衡决策与协调状态。综合考虑制造商的扶贫水平、零售商的宣传水平以及价格等因素，分别从批发价契约、成本分担契约以及两部制契约视角进行分析，探究契约对供应链决策以及利润水平的影响。结果显示，两部制契约更接近集中决策下的供应链系统利润，成本分担契约不可以同时协调制造商与零售商，但两部制契约可以使得双方达到合作共赢，且使得供应链达到Pareto优化;政府、企业应努力提高消费者扶贫意识，以此来提高供应链的利润。

关键词：扶贫供应链;消费者扶贫意识;Stackelberg博弈;契约协调

中图分类号：F274    文献标识码：A

Abstract： This paper studies the two-level supply chain in which manufacturers and retailers make poverty alleviation efforts when consumers have poverty alleviation preference， and explores the equilibrium decision-making and coordination state of the supply chain when manufacturers provide different contract coordination to retailers who make poverty alleviation publicity investment. Considering the manufacturer's poverty alleviation level， retailer's propaganda level and price， this paper analyzes the contract from the perspective of wholesale price contract， cost sharing contract and two-part contract to explore the impact of contract on supply chain decision-making and profit level. The results show that the two-part contract is closer to the profit of the supply chain system under centralized decision-making， and the cost sharing contract can't coordinate the manufacturer and retailer at the same time， but the two-part contract can make both parties achieve win-win cooperation and make the supply chain achieve Pareto optimization. The government and enterprises should strive to improve the awareness of poverty alleviation of consumers， so as to improve the profits of the supply chain.

Key words： poverty alleviation supply chain; consumer's preference for poverty alleviation; Stackelberg game; contract coordination

0  引  言

新世纪以来，我国经济发展迅速，但发展不平衡问题随之产生，贫困问题仍然不容小觑。政府出台“精准扶贫”政策鼓励企业展开扶贫活动，为贫困地区的供应商提供下游产业。在政府的号召之下，许多企业纷纷响应国家政策，将扶贫纳入企业发展战略规划，积极参与扶贫事业，许多电商企业利用自身的渠道优势以及宣传优势，大力展开扶贫工作。例如电商企业阿里巴巴、拼多多、京东等都有对应的扶贫业务。

扶贫属性是供应链管理的一个重要内涵。申云等[1]分析自主发展模式与委托发展模式下农业供应链金融信贷的减贫机制，为农业供应链金融信贷改革提供了新的思路与方法。……