雷江玲 柳璐 吴鑫

摘  要：为了研究不确定性需求环境下零售商与配送服务商之间的激励契约设计问题，针对一个拥有线上线下双渠道的零售商和一个为零售商线上渠道提供配送服务的配送服务商组成的供应链，建立了配送服务水平可观测和不可观测两种情形下的委托代理模型并设计了两种情形下的激励契约，分析了消费者线下选购概率、市场随机性以及配送服务商的风险偏好对契约的影响。研究结论显示：最优契约中的基本报酬和利润共享比例对配送服务商有不同的激励作用;与配送服务水平可观测的情形相比，配送服务水平不可观测会给零售商带来总代理成本，导致零售商利润受损，但当消费者线下购买概率较高时，信息不对称所造成的零售商利润损失会有所减小。

关键词：激励契约;非对称信息;委托代理;配送服务商

中图分类号：F274    文献标识码：A

Abstract： In order to study the design problem of incentive contracts between retailers and distribution service providers in an uncertain demand environment. Aiming at a supply chain consisting of a retailer with online and offline dual channels and a distribution service provider that provides distribution services for the retailer's online channels， principal-agent models were established under two situations where the distribution service level is observable and unobservable， and incentive contracts in the two situations were designed. The influence of consumers' offline purchase probability， market randomness and the risk preference of distribution service providers on the contract was analyzed. The research conclusion shows that： the basic reward and profit sharing ratio in the optimal contract have different incentive effects on the distribution service provider. Compared with the situation where the distribution service level is observable， the unobservable distribution service level will bring general agency costs to the retailer， resulting in damage to the retailer's profit. However， when the probability of consumers buying offline is high， the loss of profits of retailers caused by information asymmetry will be reduced.

Key words： incentive contract; asymmetric information; principal-agent; delivery service provider

0  引  言

據艾媒数据中心分析，2019年中国社会物流总费用超14万亿元，增速虽呈现下降趋势，但较上年同期增长6.0%，并指出信息不对称、组织效率低等问题在中国物流行业长期存在且愈发凸显，降本提效势在必行。其中零售商与配送服务商间的合作关系中存在的信息不对称问题就是物流行业中的痛点之一，配送服务商的配送服务水平为其私有信息，零售商无法有效监测，所以零售商在信息不对称下需建立合适的激励契约促使配送服务商提高配送服务水平，本文拟在需求环境不确定下设计配送服务水平信息不对称前后零售商与配送服务商之间的激励契约。……