张道海 刘刚良 王好时

摘  要：通過建立合同激励供应链借款人改善还款力度是解决供应链金融公司坏账问题的有效手段。在供应链金融公司与供应链借款人之间存在利益冲突和信息不对称的前提下，根据供应链金融市场的特点设计了两阶段激励合同模型，分析了供应链金融公司的最优努力水平和最优奖惩系数，并通过数值模拟研究了供应链金融公司的最优激励合同和最优收益。结果表明：①奖惩系数越大，努力成本系数越小，供应链借款人各阶段的最优努力程度越高;②奖惩系数与利润转换系数成正相关，与供应链借款人的努力成本系数、风险规避程度、还款能力方差、市场随机扰动方差负相关;③存在使供应链借款人付出最优努力并最大化供应链金融公司利润的最优激励契约;④供应链金融市场的最优收益与收益转换系数成正相关，随供应链借款人的努力成本先增加后减少，与风险规避程度、还款能力方差和市场随机扰动负相关。最后，提出了强化奖惩管理，加强大数据建设和多方联合治理的建议。

关键词：供应链金融;借款方还款;两阶段;激励契约

中图分类号：F275.6    文献标识码：A

Abstract： Encouraging borrowers to improve repayment by establishing contracts is an effective way to solve the problem of bad debts in supply chain finance companies. Under the premise of interest conflict and information asymmetry between supply chain finance company and supply chain borrower， a two-stage incentive contract model is designed according to the characteristics of supply chain financial market. The model is used to solve and analyze the optimal effort level and the optimal reward and punishment coefficient of the supply chain financial company， and research on optimal incentive contracts and optimal returns of the supply chain financial company by numerical simulation. The results show that： ①The larger the reward and punishment coefficient and the smaller the effort cost coefficient is， the higher the optimal effort degree of the borrower in each stage of the supply chain. ②The reward and punishment coefficients set by supply chain finance company are positively correlated with the income conversion coefficient， and negatively related to the cost system of the borrower's efforts， the borrower's risk aversion degree， the repayment ability variance， and the market random disturbance variance. ③There is an optimal incentive contract that allows the borrower to pay the optimal level of effort and maximize the returns of the supply chain finance company. ④The optimal return of the supply chain financial market is positively correlated with the conversion factor of returns， increases first and then decreases with the cost factor， and negatively correlates with the degree of risk aversion， the variance of repayment ability and the random disturbance of the market. On this basis， suggestions for strengthening the management of rewards and punishments， strengthening the construction of big data， and multi-party joint governance are put forward.

Key words： supply chain finance; borrower repayment; two

-stage; incentive contracts

0  引  言

供应链金融由于具有针对性强、效率高、灵活性好、信息传播无障碍等多方面的优点，更符合供应链借款人对融资“短、频、快”的需求特点，加上国家普惠金融政策的利好，供应链金融快速发展。但是在借款方还款过程中，借贷双方由于……