张玉 王世进

摘  要：以沪深两市A股采矿业上市公司为样本，实证检验了公司高管在职消费与环境信息披露之间的关系，并把企业分为股权集中度高低两组，研究在股权集中度高和股权集中度低的企业，高管在职消费和环境信息披露关系的差异。研究结果表明：高管在职消费与环境信息披露之间存在显著的正相关关系，表明高管在职消费越多，企业环境信息披露质量就越高，可见环境信息披露是高管谋取利益的自利工具。而股权集中度高的企业两者之间的正相关性则更显著。最后，针对研究结论提出相应的建议。

关键词：在职消费;环境信息披露;股权集中度;印象管理

中图分类号：F272    文献标识码：A

Abstract： Taking the listed companies of A shares mining industry in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a sample， this paper empirically tests the relationship between on-the-job consumption and environmental information disclosure of company executives， and divides them into two groups according to high and low equity concentration. The differences between on-the-job consumption and environmental information disclosure in enterprises with high equity concentration and low equity concentration were studied. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between executive on-the-job consumption and environmental information disclosure， which indicates that the more executive on-the-job consumption， the higher the quality of enterprise environmental information disclosure. Environmental information disclosure is a self-profit tool for executives to seek benefits. The positive correlation between enterprises with high equity concentration is more significant than that of enterprises with low equity concentration. Finally， in order to weaken this relationship， the corresponding suggestions are put forward.

Key words： on-the-job consumption; environmental information disclosure; equity concentration; impression management

0  引  言

高管在職消费是企业高管们的额外报酬，是一种隐性消费。管理层为了谋取私利，往往从在职消费中攫取利益。为了这种自利行为不被发现，高管们会选择一些掩饰工具，比如利用企业避税、企业扩张等，一边向市场传递良好的信号，骗取利益相关者的信任，一边肆无忌惮的谋取公司的利益。那么，除了以上掩饰工具外，高管们还有没有其他的“面具”可带？

本文认为，环境信息披露可能是高管自利的另一种掩饰工具。基于印象管理理论而言，赵敏（2007）认为印象管理是组织利用信息的特点，是有意识的操纵信息披露的内容和方式，试图影响信息使用者对对象的印象[1]。因此，高管们可能会对企业环境信息披露进行“印象管理”，从而向市场传递良好的信号，增强企业的良好形象，转移利益相关者的注意力，达到掩饰的目的。……