李宝库　吴正祥　郭婷婷

摘要：在收益共享契约模型中加入零售商的公平偏好行为，将制造商和零售商的决策分为制造商考虑零售商的公平偏好行为和制造商不考虑零售商的公平偏好行为两种情形，分别研究了不同情形下收益共享契约的协调性以及零售商公平偏好对收益共享契约机制协调性的影响。结果表明：零售商公平偏好对收益共享契约协调性的影响在于其影响收益共享契约被接受的条件；当零售商的公平偏好程度较低时，收益共享契约机制可以实现渠道的完美共赢协调；当零售商的公平偏好程度达到一定值时，收益共享契约机制的协调性将会失效。此外，当收益共享契约对制造商考虑和不考虑零售商公平偏好的两种情形均可以实现渠道的完美共赢协调时，制造商考虑零售商的公平偏好有利于其自身获得更多的新增利润。

关键词：公平偏好；收益共享；乘法需求；渠道协调

DOI：10.13956/j.ss.1001-8409.2016.05.28

中图分类号：F274 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1001-8409（2016）05-0130-06

Abstract：In this paper， the fairness preference was introduced into the model of revenue sharing contract. Two different revenue sharing contract models were constructed under two different situations in which the manufacturer considers retailers fairness preference or regardless of retailers fairness preference. The behavior of manufacturer and retailer was analyzed； the coordination effect of revenue sharing contract in two different situations and the influence of the fairness preference of retailer on the coordination effect of revenue sharing contract were discussed. The results show that the impact of the fairness preference of retailer on the coordination effect of revenue sharing contract lies in it influence the condition that the contract was accepted. In addition， when the degree of the preference is low， the contract can realize channel winwin coordination； however， when the degree reached a certain threshold， the coordination will be invalid. At the same time， when the contract can realize channel coordination in the two different conditions， manufacturer considers retailers preference to participate in the game was in favor of improving his new profit.

Key words：fairness preference； revenue sharing contract； multiplicative demand； channel coordination

由于组成供应链的不同成员独自决策会出现双重边际化，且降低了供应链的运作效率，因此供应链协调成为学者研究的一个重要问题。现有文献主要研究不同条件下或者不同契约模式下的供应链协调问题[1～4]。零售商具有公平偏好条件下收益共享契约对供应链的协调问题是本文研究的重点。

关于收益共享契约国内外学者已进行了大量研究。Cachon和Lariviere[5]建立了根据各零售商的购买数量和价格来确定收益分享率的一般模型，对比分析了收益共享契约与其他契约的协调性。……