Jin Linbo

The ups and downs of the U.S.-Japan alliance are one of the most important factors influencing the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region as well as in the whole world. The reshuffle of the Japanese foreign policy after the Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ) came to power led to the cracks and even unprecedented crisis of political confidence in the bilateral relations. With the increasing concerns over a rising China by the United States and Japan, the U.S. strategic focus shifting to Asia-Pacific and the readjustment of the U.S.-Japan security strategy, the U.S.-Japan alliance, which was once in low ebb, has been restored and strengthened in a comprehensive way. Against the backdrop of an evolving security environment in East Asia, it is necessary and practical to review the deep-rooted reasons and long-term impacts of the changes in the U.S.-Japan relations so as to accurately understand and grasp the security development in East Asia and the changes in major powers’relationships.

I. Crises of Confidence

Soon after Barack Obama took office of the presidency in January 2009, the U.S. administration started to work out its foreign policy priority in Asia. In order to show its importance attached to Asia and to Japan by a Democratic-led U.S. government,President Obama received Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso during his visit to the United States in February and the two sides held summit meetings in Washington. Prime Minister Taro Aso became the first head of state to be received by President Obama in the White House. At the same time, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also had her first visit in February and, unlike her predecessor, she made Japan the first leg of her visit to Asian countries which also included Indonesia, the ROK and China. Although such arrangement, on the surface, seems not to have substantive significance, yet it constitutes initial signals of America’s pivot strategy to the Asia-Pacific region. It also shows the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in America’s shifting strategic focus to the region.

To lay more stresses on an equal relationship with the United States constituted apparently a major readjustment in Japan’s diplomatic strategy by the DPJ-led government.

Great changes took place in Japan’s political situation 8 months after President Obama entered the White House. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the victory in Japan’s Diet by nearly two thirds of seats. The DPJ, together with the Social Democratic Party and the National New Party, formed the government with the DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama as the Prime Minister. Very soon the Hatoyama cabinet started to make reforms to Japan’s domestic and foreign policies. Prime Minister Hatoyama worked hard for an all-round diplomacy based on the spirit of“friendship.”While reconstructing equal relations with the United States, he strived to strengthen Japan’s relations with its neighboring countries including China, the ROK and ASEAN countries, and to push forward the building of the East Asian Community. With the great efforts made by Mr. Hatoyama, equal U.S.-Japan relations and the East Asian Community became two highlights in Japan’s foreign policy reform attracting world-wide attention.

To lay more stresses on an equal relationship with the United States constituted apparently a major readjustment in Japan’s diplomatic strategy by the DPJ-led government. During the fivedecade ruling by the LDP after World War II, Japan’s relationship with the United States was regarded as the axis in Japan’s foreign policy. All administrations gave special attentions to this bilateral relationship and refrained from making any policy readjustments to it. Both Washington and Tokyo are used to the pattern in which Japan follows America’s leadership, and with which the United States feels so confident and is free from any doubts. The DPJ put forward in its platform, during the Diet election in August 2009, two objectives in foreign policy change, that is, to reconstruct equal Japan-U.S. relations and to boost Japan’s Asian diplomacy with the aim of building up East Asian Community. However, these political party electioneering slogans failed to attract necessary attentions from the Obama administration. When the Hatoyama government started to change foreign policy and adjusted its relations with the United States, Washington felt so unexpected and unprepared.

The Hatoyama government, to show its brand-new diplomatic concept towards the United States as well as its political determination, adopted the following three approaches which were bold enough to make the Obama administration unhappy and even annoyed: the first was to set up an investigation team in the Foreign Ministry and a committee of eminent persons in September and November 2009, to invest Japan-U.S. secret nuclear treaty and other related issues which were denied by all Japanese governments, and released the findings in March 2010, to confirm the existence of the treaty. The second ap-proach was to terminate fuel supplies to the United States and British anti-terrorist fleets in Indian Ocean by the Japanese marine self-defense force which started since 2001. The third approach was to stop implementation of agreement reached between the LDP government and the United States in 2006 on the relocation of the U.S. military air base in Futenma,Okinawa, and decided to find a new site outside of the Okinawa prefecture or outside of Japan.

Taking the history of the development of the relations between Japan and the United States into consideration, the abovementioned three approaches were indeed extraordinary. And the discontinued implementation of the relocation of Futenma military airbase made the American administration feel unease,perplex and even angry. There are deep-rooted reasons for the Hatoyama government to take such bold actions in Japan’s relations with the United States.

First of all, the DPJ has to expand and consolidate domestic public supports by showing its non-LDP feature and especially its difference with the LDP in Japan’s U.S. policy. After World War II, the Japanese society has long been troubled by Japan’s obsession with its special relations with the United States and unequal bilateral relationship. The secret nuclear treaty and the relocation of the Futenma military airbase are typical examples of such perplex. The mainstream public opinions in Japan supports the maintenance and the development of the Japan-U.S. relations, however, dissatisfactions appear from time to time over Japan’s over-dependence as well as total reliance of the United States in the neglect of Asia when the LDP was in power. Such dissatisfactions show apparently that how to achieve a relative equilibrium between Japan’s U.S. policy and its Asian policy and make its relations with Washington on a more equal footing is an important subject the Japanese society expected to tackle with in Japan’s foreign policies.

Secondly, the diplomatic concepts advocated by senior and powerful figures in the DPJ like Yukio Hatoyama and Ichiro Ozawa were the driving force pushing the Hatoyama government to make adjustment to Japan’s relations with the United States. Prime Minister Hatoyama, as a politician with strong idealism, carried a strong political will to construct an equal relationship with the United States and to build up the East Asian Community. Prime Minister Hatoyama was not against the mainstream concept that the Japan-U.S. relationship is the axis in Japan’s foreign policies. However he paid more attention to a more equal relationship with Washington in Japan’s diplomacy.At the same time, he took the position that an equal Japan-U.S. relationship is reflected not only in their bilateral ties, but also in Japan’s efforts to advance the concept of the East Asian Community. In fact, supporters of Hatoyama concepts like Ichiro Ozawa and other high-ranking DPJ figures proposed in clear-cut terms policies of building up an“equilateral triangle relationship”among Japan, the United States and China.Such policy proposals by Prime Minister Hatoyama and other DPJ leaders, and especially that of East Asian Community,caused puzzles, perplex and even strong dissatisfaction from the White House. The Obama administration is of the view that Hatoyama’s U.S. policy enlarged the gap between the two countries and estranged the alliance. What makes the White House more anxious and embarrassed was that the blueprint of the East Asian Community intended to exclude the United States from the community and even from Asia.

Thirdly, the relocation of the Futenma airbase constituted a breakthrough in Hatoyama’s efforts to put Japan’s relations with the United States on an equal footing. Since the matter became one of the important issues impacting future political and security cooperation between Japan and the United States, any progress made on the Futenma airbase would have the effect of“killing several birds with only one stone.”By responding to the political appeal from the country and from the Okinawa Prefecture, the Hatoyama cabinet intended to seek a gradual decrease of American military bases in Japan. And by daring to say“no”to the United States, the DPJ government intended to demonstrate the political will for an equal Japan-U.S. relationship and boost domestic public support to the DPJ. However, the Hatoyama government failed to achieve any progress on the issue of the Futenma military airbase. Moreover,because of strong rejection and opposition from Washington,the Futenma military airbase became the direct reason for Prime Minister Hatoyama’s resignation.

Such a serious political consequence was brought about by the Futenma airbase issue. The main reason was not only due to its complexity and sensitiveness, but also to its direct ignition for unprecedented crises of political trust between the Japanese and the U.S. governments. The Futenma military airbase is situated in Ginowan City, Okinawa. In 1995 local girls were raped by three American soldiers, and airbase noises and security problems exist for a long time. After years of negotiation, Japan and the United States reached an agreement in 2006 to move the airbase to the Camp Schwab in Nago, Okinawa. For the sake of its strategic need of redeploying military force in the Pacific, the United States has expected an earlier implementation of the relocation agreement. However,the fulfillment of the agreement was delayed again and again,because it was related to complex sentiments as well as interests concerning the two governments, the Okinawa Prefecture and the local people. What made the Americans intolerable was that soon after the Hatoyama government took office, it decided to cease the implementation of the hard-won agreement between the two governments, and declared to move the airbase out of Okinawa or even out of Japan.

本书为“含章文库”品牌系列之一，精选沈从文先生写给妻子张兆和的书信数十篇及五篇以爱情为主题的短篇小说，以纯真质朴的笔触抒写爱情的各种滋味，篇目经典，编校精当，集中体现了一代文人的浪漫情怀，使读者充分领略沈从文文字的独特魅力。本书为精装，特别收录原创中国传统彩墨插图三十幅，图文相得益彰，湘西风情跃然纸上。

From the Japanese point of view, a reconsideration of the Futenma airbase relocation agreement is reasonable and accords with public opinions. Therefore, the Hatoyama government found it hard not to follow the public opinions. When Japan was faced with a dilemma and the government could not decide a new site for the U.S. military airbase, Washington did not extend any sympathy or understanding. It showed no concessions,insisting on Japan’s implementation of the agreement. During his visit to Japan in November 2009, President Barack Obama talked to Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, hoping the Futenma airbase issue could be settled by the end of the year. Prime Minister Hatoyama said“please believe me”. The Americans thought Japan would carry out the relocation agreement as soon as possible. However, Japan kept on beating around the bush on the issue which made the Americans very disappointed. The divergences and conflicts between the United States and Japan on the Futenma airbase issue not only led to a political trust crises between the two governments, but also turned President Barack Obama’s confidence over Prime Minister Hatoyama to a slump. Prime Minister Hatoyama, confronted with such a difficult situation, staked repeatedly his political future, and promised to find a solution no later than May 2010. Yet finally he had to give up his promises because of the uncooperative attitude from Washington, internal divergences among the three-Party ruling coalition and the rising movement against military airbase in Okinawa. At the end of May 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama issued a joint statement with the United States, and accepted almost completely the relocation agreement reached when the LDP was in power. The issue of the Futenma airbase, which was supposed to be a breakthrough in Hatoyama’s reform to Japan-U.S. relations, returned to its starting point after 9 months ups and downs. Prime Minister had to hand in his resignation in June 2010 in the face of his unfulfilled political promise on the Futenma airbase issue and of the difficult situation of a breakup of the three-Party ruling coalition.

II. Restoration of the Alliance

Hatoyama’s resignation relaxed to some extend the tensions between Japan and the United States, yet it did not restore or improve automatically the Japan-U.S. alliance. In fact,during the 9-months rule by Prime Minister Hatoyama, Japan readjusted unilaterally its relations with the United States,the United States resorted to both overt and covert steps to exert pressures on Japan and even took certain“retaliatory”measures against Japan, thus intensifying their divergences and confrontations. Since 2009 when Mr. Hatoyama took office,Washington put pressures on Japan repeatedly, asking Japan to continue fuel supplies to American fleet in Indian Ocean and implement as soon as possible the Futenma airbase relocation agreement. At the same time, the United States, through direct and indirect political and economic measures, tried to defame Japanese corporate image and the DPJ-led ruling coalition by forcing Toyota Motor Corporation on unprecedented car recalls.Besides, the Obama administration went further to reduce intentionally high-level official contacts and exchanges or to lower meeting levels. Washington even took measures to turn those reluctantly-held high-level meetings into courtesy calls,or simply to use meetings to repeat its principles and positions,so as to increase psychological pressures on the Hatoyama government in its dealing with the United States. Undoubtedly such psychological warfare against Japanese top officials exerted huge amount of impacts on Hatoyama’s successors.

Mr. Naoto Kan became the DPJ’s new boss and the successor to Hatoyama. When the Kan cabinet was in office, to restore and improve Japan’s relations with the United States was a priority in Japan’s diplomacy since the fall of the former government was caused directly by a worsening Japan-U.S. relationship. In September 2010, Prime Minister Naoto Kan paid his first official visit to the United States. In the talks with President Barack Obama, he expressed clearly that Japan-U.S. alliance was the base for maintaining Asian as well as world peace and stability,and it was the axis in Japan’s diplomacy. He also declared that the Kan government would deepen the development of the bilateral relations in the fields of security, economy, culture and personal exchanges. At the same time, in order to dispel America’s political distrust on the issues of the Futenma airbase and the East Asian Community, Prime Minister Naoto Kan expressed in particular Japan’s determination to relocate the Futenma airbase in accordance with the agreement. He also said that although he personally agreed with Hatoyama’s proposal for an East Asian Community, yet the Community should be constructed with the United States included. He expressed his understanding of President Barack Obama’s emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and welcomed American participation in East Asia Summit. Although the efforts made by Prime Minister Naoto Kan to restore Japan’s relations with the United States were not enough to remove completely American misgivings and dissatisfaction, yet he had received a positive response from the White House. The first Japan-U.S. summit after the Kan cabinet took office prevented further worsening of the bilateral relationship and promoted reconstruction of mutual trusts between top leaders. It also signified that the Japan-U.S.relations started its gradual restoration after 9 months’crisis.

In order to avoid mistakes made in the past, Mr. Naoto Kan adopted a U.S. policy different from his predecessor. On the one hand, it stressed strategic importance of the alliance with the United States on political security; on the other hand, it adopted more flexible, perfunctory and dilatory tactics on the Futenma airbase relocation issue. It took an evasive attitude on the TPP and other issues which America had expected an active participation from Japan. Prime Minister Naoto Kan, as the host in the APEC meeting in Yokohama, Japan in November 2011, expressed Japan’s positive attitude on TPP, however,evaded questions concerning Japan’s participation. The U.S.policies carried out by the Kan government achieved success,and Japan avoided continuing of the American dissatisfactions toward Japan and maintained a momentum of step-by-step improvement of the bilateral relations, though no substantial progress was made on the Futenma airbase and TPP issues.

In international affairs, the Kan government was confronted with a more severe environment when handling thorny issues of escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula caused by the Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incidents and the rapid worsening of China-Japan relations caused by ship collision incident. Under the circumstances when the nuclear issue on the Peninsula and the kidnapping issue remain intact and the tension escalates on the Peninsula in the wake of the Cheonan incident, the voices from the Japanese public for a strengthened defense force to cope with security threats from the Peninsula get louder. However, the military reaction capacity of Japan and its influence over the Korean Peninsular affairs are apparently insufficient. Against this background, it becomes the priority for the Kan government to increase Japan’s political and security cooperation with the United States and the ROK in order to boost its own capability. In addition to the Korean Peninsula, the Kan administration was confronted with a more severe challenge of rapid worsening of China-Japan relations caused by a collision of Chinese fishing boats with Japanese coast guard patrol boats in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands on September 7, 2010. The Japanese side, under the pretext of obstructing its official business, arrested the Chinese captain Mr.Zhan Qixiong, thus bringing about a strong reaction from China.The Chinese side summoned Japanese Ambassador Niwa Uichiro in Beijing several times to protest against Japanese illegal detention of Chinese fishermen, and at the same time adopted political and economic measures against Japan. Both in China and Japan there were demonstrations against the other side, the confrontational sentiments from both countries rose. With strong pressures from home and abroad, the public prosecutors office of the Naha District, Okinawa, released the Chinese captain on September 24, as a result the intense confrontation between China and Japan caused by the collision incident was relaxed to a certain extent.

In the political dynamics of triangle relations among China, the United States and Japan, the collision incident produced two different political and security effects.

In the political dynamics of triangle relations among China,the United States and Japan, the collision incident produced two different political and security effects. On the one hand, the incident plunged the relatively stable China-Japan relations to its lowest point. On the other hand, it provided a favorable environment for continued improvement of relations between Japan and the United States. In the face of a rising China and initiatives taken by China in maintaining its sovereignty on the Diaoyu Islands, Japan feels it necessary and urgent to strengthen its alliance with the United States. Washington regards intensified disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands a rare opportunity for the Obama administration to drag Japan into their joint strategic alliance against China to rebuild Japan-U.S. security ties. In the aftermath of the collision incident, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara in New York on September 23,and said that“the Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed in 1960 applies to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)”,specifying on clear terms American official position to render assistance to Japan’s defense. She elaborated once again the above-mentioned position of the U.S. government on October 27 in meeting the press in Hawaii together with the Japanese foreign minister. At the same time, the then Defense Secretary Robert Gates, during his meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, said that both the United States and Japan should abide by the security treaty in their common maintenance of stability in the East China Sea including the“Senkaku Islands”(Diaoyu Islands). When the disputes between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands get intensified, the U.S. administration’s repeated proclamation of its position on the issue has boosted Japan’s confidence and capability to ally with the United States in containing China.

American strategic shifting to the Asia-Pacific region signifies not only increased U.S. military force in the region, but also strengthened relations with regional allies and America’s alliance with Japan in particular.

III. Strategic Readjustments

The restoration and improvement of Japan-U.S. relations were helped by incidental events like Japan’s major earthquake and the collision between Chinese fishing boats and Japanese ships. But fundamentally speaking, they were promoted by America’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and by readjustments of Japanese as well as U.S. Asia-Pacific strategies. As mentioned before,the Obama administration,at its early time in office, has prioritized its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the America’s strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region was not obvious before 2011 because its strategic adjustment on Iraq and Afghanistan consumed most of its energy. In February 2011 the U.S. Defense Department issued its 2011 National Military Strategy in which America’s shifting of its strategic focus to Asia was clearly specified. The report said that the United States would in future confront with more challenges in the Asia-Pacific region in light of factors like rising China and India and North Korea’s nuclear weapon development. To cope with all these challenges, America would continue to increase cooperation with traditional allies of the ROK, Japan and Australia while expanding its military cooperation with the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia,Pakistan, Indonesia and Singapore.

A few months after the release of the military strategy report,the U.S. State Department made public in October 2011 an article by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which she wrote for the Foreign Policy with the title“America’s Pacific Century”.Hillary Clinton pointed out,“The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action.… One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic,economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”

American strategic shifting to the Asia-Pacific region signifies not only increased U.S. military force in the region, but also strengthened relations with regional allies and America’s alliance with Japan in particular. On June 21, 2011, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee held meeting in Washington with the participation of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates on the U.S. side,and Foreign Minister Matsumoto and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa on the Japanese side. In their joint statement entitled“Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership”, a consensus was reached on further strengthening bilateral military and security cooperation and on comprehensive adjustment of their common strategic objectives.In terms of their military and security cooperation, the two sides reached the following understandings: (1) to permit the United States to sell to third parties sea-based interceptor missiles(SM-3 Block 2A) developed jointly with Japan, and to support more Japanese participation in international arms research and development (this understanding provides favorable conditions for Japan’s possible revision of three principles regarding arms exports which were persistently adhered to by Japan in the post-war time.); (2) to deal with jointly non-traditional security challenges and threats in outer space, on the high seas and in cyberspace; and (3) to reconfirm the agreed Futenma airbase relocation program, the original time limit of 2014 for the relocation is given up and a new implementation time will be put into practice“at an early date.”On their common strategic objectives, the statement put forward 24 new objectives after reconfirming and modifying 2005 and 2007 strategic objectives.China-related strategic objective was that the United States and Japan would urge China to play a responsible and constructive role in the maintenance of regional stability and prosperity,to comply with the international code of conducts on global issues, and to increase openness and transparency in China’s military modernization and military activities. On the issue of Taiwan, the statement welcomed an improvement in cross-Strait relations and hoped that the issues would be resolved through cross-Strait dialogues. According to Japanese news media reports, both American and Japanese foreign ministers bluntly accused China for instability in East Asia. When explaining to the media the core content of the joint statement,the official from the Japanese government said that through this statement the United States and Japan actually declared China a threat. The U.S.-Japan joint statement pushed forward the process of restoring their relations. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell commented after the meeting that the consensus on the common strategic objectives signified that the U.S.-Japan relations had returned to normal track.

Pushed by the factors like Japan’s grave earthquake, collision disputes between China and Japan as well as the American and Japanese strategic adjustments, rapid progress was made in restoring and improving the U.S.-Japan relations. The Kan government also gained more maneuvering space in Japan’s diplomacy. However, the diplomatic glamour benefited from improved relations with the United States is not enough to support a stable operation of the government. The Kan government was severely attacked by the LDP and other political forces for its inadequate earthquake relief work. In the face of ever-increasing infighting in the DPJ and sharp falls of public support, the Kan government could not hold on the situation and the cabinet handed in the resignation in August 2011. New DPJ leader Yoshihiko Noda became new prime minister and the Noda government assumed office.

Compared with his predecessors, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda understands more clearly the importance of Japan’s relations with the United States. When interviewed by The Wall Street Journal before his first visit to Washington in September 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that he believed that the Japan-U.S. alliance was the axis not only in the diplomatic and security fields, but also in other fields including the economy.In his meeting with President Barack Obama, he said that the post-earthquake Japan was firmer in believing that the alliance with the United States was the core in Japan’s foreign policy. It shows that Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s understanding of Japan-U.S. relations is on a par with all his LDP predecessors,and the U.S. policies pursued by the DPJ converge with those of the LDP. Driven by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s pro-American attitudes, Japan not only has speeded up all-round restoration and deepening of the relations with the United States in the security and diplomatic fields, but also made a political decision on its participation in TPP negotiation in the economic field.

Prime Minister Noda paid an official visit to the United States in April 2012. The two sides held their summit in the White House and issued a joint statement“A common blueprint for the future”. The summit was the first held in the White House since 2009 when the DPJ was in power, and the joint statement was the first since 2006 when the Koizumi government and Bush administration issued the statement of“U.S.-Japan Alliance in a New Century”. The joint statement confirmed increased defense cooperation between the two countries, implementation of building a dynamic defense force enacted in Japan’s“National Defense Program Outline”and American attention to its new defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The issuance of the joint statement signifies complete restoration and further uplifting of U.S.-Japan relations which were brought into crises by the DPJ government. The restoration and uplifting of the U.S.-Japan relations are realized by the pro-American attitudes of the Noda government, and are also related to a growing“China factor”. Japan’s Kyodo News commented that the purpose of the U.S.-Japan joint statement was to contain China’s increasing military strength and deepen Japan-U.S.alliance in maintaining stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

The growing“China factor”has become an important external facilitating factor for better Japan-U.S. relations during the time of the DPJ regime. Strategically speaking, how to manage a relatively stable relationship with a rapidly developing China at a time when the security situation is getting more complicated in Asia, this has become a major issue both the United States and Japan have to face while making efforts to strengthen their bilateral relations. In his talks with President Barack Obama,Prime Minister Noda initiated a proposal of strategic dialogues among Japan, the United States and China (Japanese Foreign Minister Genba Koichiro once made the same proposal to China and the United States), showing to certain extent that Japan has already started relevant diplomatic moves on the issue.

IV. Conclusion and Prospects

The U.S.-Japan alliance, at the time when the DPJ is in power, has undergone a process from unprecedented trust crises to gradual restoration and improvement. The reason for crises lies with in-depth contradictions on foreign policy concepts between top leaders of the two countries, as well as some protracted problems like the relocation of Futenma airbase. The current U.S.-Japan relations have been restored, improved and uplifted. However,the two countries can not eliminate totally cracks left over by their previous crises of mutual trusts.

Future efforts for a stronger alliance relationship between the United States and Japan will have to rely on the stimulation and facilitation by external factors.

The latest domestic political situation in Japan has been troubling the two governments about the resolution of the Futenma airbase relocation. In July 2012, 12 local autonomous entities in Northern Okinawa, which had given their consistent supports to the relocation program, changed their position by opposing resolutely the relocation plan pursued by the Japanese and the U.S. governments. Now the relocation issue of the Futenma airbase is besieged with more difficulties. At the same time, American deployment of Osprey transport helicopters is also opposed and resisted in Japan. In the U.S.-Japan relations, the possibility of a complete removal of differences on the Futenma airbase issue becomes more remote. Under such circumstance, future efforts for a stronger alliance relationship between the United States and Japan will have to rely on the stimulation and facilitation by external factors.