王伶俐 汪传旭 程琴

摘要：針对船公司实施减排策略和不实施减排策略所在的两条海运供应链，考虑政府补贴和货主低碳偏好，研究不同海运供应链中船公司减排优化问题。分别建立无政府补贴和有政府补贴的船公司减排博弈模型，获得各自的最优决策，并分析相关变量对政府补贴系数、船公司减排水平、船公司利润和社会福利的影响。研究表明：无论政府是否补贴，选择减排策略的船公司的利润总大于不选择减排策略的船公司（即普通船公司）的利润;政府补贴能够提高选择减排策略的船公司的减排水平和利润，但对普通船公司利润的影响是非单一的，货主低碳偏好程度不超过某一阈值时，政府补贴对于普通船公司弊大于利;社会福利随减排成本系数的增大而减小，随货主低碳偏好程度的增大而增大。

关键词：

海运供应链; 碳减排; 政府补贴; 低碳偏好

中图分类号：  F552.6

文献标志码：  A

收稿日期： 2020-06-15

修回日期： 2020-09-10

基金项目： 国家自然科学基金（71974123）;上海市科研创新计划（2017-01-07-00-10-E00016）

作者简介：

王伶俐（1997—），女，安徽铜陵人，硕士研究生，研究方向为航运与供应链管理，（E-mail）shiguangduian@163.com;

汪传旭（1967—），男，安徽安庆人，教授，博导，博士，研究方向为物流与供应链管理，（E-mail）cxwang18@aliyu.com

Emission reduction decision of shipping companies considering

government subsidies and shippers low-carbon preference

WANG Lingli， WANG Chuanxu， CHENG Qin

（School of Economics & Management， Shanghai Maritime University， Shanghai 201306， China）

Abstract：

For two shipping supply chains where one shipping company implements emission reduction strategies and the other does not implement emission reduction strategies， the optimization of shipping company emission reduction in different shipping supply chains is studied with the consideration of government subsidies and shippers low-carbon preference. The game models of emission reduction of shipping companies without government subsidies and with government subsidies are established， respectively， shipping companiesoptimal decisions are obtained， and the impacts of relevant variables on the government subsidy coefficient， the shipping company emission reduction level， the shipping company profit and the social welfare are analyzed. The results show that， regardless of whether the government subsidizes shipping companies， the profit of the shipping companies that choose emission reduction strategies is always greater than the profit of the shipping companies that do not choose emission reduction strategies （that is， ordinary shipping companies）; government subsidies can improve the emission reduction level and profit of shipping companies selecting emission reduction strategies， but the impact on the profit of ordinary shipping companies is not single. When the low-carbon preference degree of shippers does not exceed a certain threshold， government subsidies do more harm than good to ordinary shipping companies.The social welfare decreases with the increase of the cost coefficient of emission reduction， and increases with the increase of the low-carbon preference degree of shippers.

Key words：

shipping supply chain; carbon emission reduction; government subsidy; low-carbon preference

0 引 言

当今世界，海运是国际贸易的主要载体，但海运带来的污染不容小觑，尤其在港口城市，海运带来的碳排放污染对周边居民和环境危害巨大。2018年4月13日，国际海事组织（IMO）在伦敦签署了一项海运减排协议，减排目标是到2050年把海运二氧化碳排放量减少至2008年的50%，并推动航运业逐步朝零排放目标迈进[1]。……