纪淑娟　包春晓　孙冠冠　张纯金

摘 要：卖方为追求利润快速增长会通过各种攻击策略破坏电子商务平台信誉系统。现有抵御策略大多是通过机器学习等相关技术从过程或结果治理角度实现，但这些方法很难从根本上解决虚假交易问题。针对以上问题，结合博弈论机制设计领域相关知识，从减少造假动机角度出发，提出一种适应于无垄断型电商市场对称演化的卖方诚信博弈模型。模型稳定性理论分析和模拟仿真实验都直观清晰地展示出模型中各参数对电商市场中卖家诚信演化稳定性的影响。实验结果表明，从动机角度出发，采取相应措施能够又好又快地促进更多的卖方选择诚实交易策略。随着演化的进行，虚假交易将最终退出市场。

关键词：电子商务;造假动机;机制设计;演化博弈;无垄断

DOI：10. 11907/rjdk. 191467

中图分类号：TP301   文献标识码：A                文章编号：1672-7800（2020）003-0021-06

Research on Sellers Honest Game Model on E-commerce Platform

JI Shu-juan1，2，BAO Chun-xiao1，SUN Guan-guan1，ZHANG Chun-jin3

（1. College of Computer Science and Engineering， Shandong University of Science and Technology;

2. Key Laboratory for Wisdom Mine Information Technology of Shandong Province， Shandong University of Science and Technology;

3. Network Information Center， Shandong University of Science and Technology， Qingdao 266590，China）

Abstract：In order to pursue rapid profit growth， many sellers damage the reputation system of e-commerce platform through various attack strategies. Most of the existing defense strategies are implemented from the perspective of process or result governance through machine learning and other related technologies， but these methods are difficult to fundamentally avoid the occurrence of false transaction phenomenon. In view of the above problems， by combining with the relevant knowledge in the field of game theory mechanism design， this paper puts forward a sellers honesty game model adapted to the symmetrical evolution of non-monopoly e-commerce market from the perspective of reducing the motivation of fraud. Both the theoretical analysis of the model stability and the simulation experiment clearly and intuitively demonstrate the influence of the parameters in the model on the integrity evolution stability of sellers in the e-commerce market. The experimental results show that， from the perspective of motivation， taking appropriate measures can promote more sellers to choose honest trading strategies quickly and well. As the evolution progresses， there will be no more false transactions in the market eventually.

Key Words：E-commerce; fraud motivation; mechanism design; evolutionary game; no monopoly

0 引言

電子商务平台在繁荣景象的背后已经出现了非常严重的信任问题。相比现实生活中的面对面交易，网络交易具有匿名性、虚无性和不对称性等特点，致使在电子商务平台中建立信任比较困难。

现有的信用评价模型能够防御大多数攻击策略，但不能抵御所有信用攻击。在造假评价比重占比较多的情况下，基于累加方法的信用模型（AARE模型[1]、E-Sporas模型[2]和C2CRep模型[3]）对女巫的抗攻击性较差;基于过滤方法的信用模型（iCLUB模型[4-5]和BRS模型[6]）和基于信念的信用模型（LTSL模型[7-8]和TNA-SL模型[9]）能够抵御大多数信用攻击策略，但对女巫攻击和漂白攻击抵御能力较差;基于折扣方法的信用模型（TRAVOS模型[10]和Personalized模型[11]）对女巫攻击和共谋攻击的抗击能力较差;基于贝叶斯概率的信用模型（FG-Trust模型[12]）虽然对抵御女巫攻击和共谋攻击效果较理想，但对漂白攻击的抗击能力较差;基于进化方法的信用模型（MET模型[13]和PEALGA模型[14]）又对不公平评分的抗攻击能力较差。