[1]The question to be considered in this and adjacent paragraphs is, How the scientific pursuit of the truth, in its various argumentational configurations, realized in the thought of structuralist thinkers engaged in textual studies. An account of the way in which these scholars tend to (in Peirce’s terminology) settle their beliefs and create thinking habits will, it is hoped, provide a deeper insight into the semiological approach to the text-phenomenon, that is, into its procedure, assumptions, and conclusions. Beyond this immediate purpose, it is also hoped that the discussion here will bring some additional clarity to the problematic and, indeed, controversial division between linguistic semiotics and general semiotics, as roughly embodied in the Saussurean and the Peircean traditions of semiotics, respectively. It will be argued that these semiotic theories are anchored in different types of reasoning which determine their conclusions and, particularly, the extent to which those conclusions reflect the objective truth — that is, the extent to which they can rightly be called scientific inquiries.

[2]Modern European structuralist scholarship pursues a mainly deductive course of reasoning; and the same is, a fortiori, true for text-grammatical research — entirely based, as it is, on formal methods approa-ching those of mathematics. Text-grammar differs from structuralism in that its reliance upon a deductive argumentation is professed overtly and without disguise; whereas structuralism proceeds in a more insidiously deductive manner. Both discursive procedures present themselves, however, as necessary reasoning; to each particular case (such as text data) a general rule is applied which is assumed to provide the exclusive key to its meaning. The rule to which structuralism applies — and, indeed, seeks almost to enforce as the only possible option — suggests that all semiotic objects, such as texts, are optimally and exhaustively categorized into binary oppositions. On the assumption that this is a true premiss corresponding to a valid abstraction from the facts, the conclusions drawn from it would necessarily be true. On the other hand, a falsification of the rule would, according to this line of thought, automatically invalidate the conclusions drawn from it. The whole procedure would thereby have to be regarded as a simple calculation error — a blunder requiring swift correction.

[3]First, let us consider the scope of the rule. Rules applied in any form of argumentation are not God-given laws but man-made principles. They are of conventional or experiential origin, based upon pure agreement, on a product of previous experience and the lessons drawn from it, or on a mixture of both. In the case of a strictly conventional rule — the case of pure deduction — the agreement may be ad hoc decision and/or a long-standing habit, sanctified through long years of practice during which time the memory of the original ru-ling act has gradually faded into oblivion. The sacrosanct rule-as-such having then become ossified, it is symbolized — which is to say that it is merely enacted and re-enacted in its applications. Although the rule is therein (iconically) exhibited and (indexically) pointed toward, its validity is itself never again explicitly brought into question. A preestablished rule is therefore not tested out on random cases; because, if it were, an exception could be found, which would contradict the rule and thereby jeopardize the unfailing and definitive nature of the procedure.

[4]The leading principle of structuralism — binarism — has acquired the character of a conventional rule. The rule of binary oppositions constitutes the rigidly fixed a priori which has been elevated to the status of universal rule. But it has not been verified statistically, on the basis of random examples, prior to its having achieved this sophisticated status. The experiential rule is more flexible than its conventional counterpart, and it results from some form of practical experimentation that has led inductively to its adoption. Whenever it is used for reasoning of a formal nature, this strictly hoc tempore rule, based on experience, makes for a symbo-lic reasoning procedure with strong indexical overtones. By the same token, Peirce stated that induction “is justifiable as long as one keeps on the alert for the first exception”, for if and when this case occurs, the experiment requires revision or even rejection of the rule (not the case!), whereupon a new experiment can be carried out, and so forth. Each experiment can, of course, also confirm the existing rule and thereby streng-then its validity. In short, the rule is, in scientifically valid reasoning, the standard or norm resulting from an ongoing process of learning and growth. In Peirce’s pragmaticist view, this is the right kind of rule: one which is experimentally concluded from the premisses and not one which is presupposed by them, as is the rule in deduction — and hence in structuralist policy.

—选自Gorlée, D., Dinda, L. 2004. On Translating Signs: Exploring Text and Semio-Translation. Amsterdam, NY: Rodopi, pp.67-69.

[5]According to Peirce, only if knowledge is improved, challenged, and continually increased, and only if in the process new insights are allowed to be developed and tried out, does Ransdell’s “communal hunt” stand a chance of being a living pursuit that will approximate to its purpose and goal. All scientifically valid reasoning owes its “efficiency” to the fact that it must involve a blend of both the empirical (induction) and the law-like (deduction), both being preceded by the hypothetical (abduction). Such a threefold, mixed scenario first infers from an actual fact, event, or phenomenon a hypothetical “maybe,” followed by a “would be”; the latter is the inductive conclusion, which, as Peirce stated, “can be (usually) but indefinite, and can never be certain”. To this Peirce hastened to add what seems to be a correction: “But in ordinary cases an induction would become both precise and certain”. It is clear that in Peirce’s evolutionary concept of pragmatism, the two last-quoted statements do not contradict but reciprocally support, each other.

[6]In Peirce’s variety of pragmatism, the conditional futurity of “would be” is required in order for reasoning to conform to the essence of reality and truth; it proposes a law which is the product of human reason in all its virtues and limitations, which is not infallible but ultimately inspired by reasonableness. Only after an infinite series of cases has been closely studied can true answer be given. In contradistinction to the conditio-nal mood of “would be”, structuralism advances absolute “must be”s. The latter policy is falsely assumed to lead directly to the truth, what it does is to undercut the creative dialogue between rule and experience. This concept of “law” takes a shortcut to the “truth” by taking the preestablished rule and creating absolute uniformity with it. It is, however, a bare uniformity among faits accomplis, and its futurity is a merely self-fulfilling prophecy.