□ 文/亨利·J·舒马赫

By J. Berkshire Miller

推动东盟经济一体化轮值主席国菲律宾有哪些动作

□ 文/亨利·J·舒马赫

2016年9月8日，东盟峰会闭幕仪式在老挝万象举行，菲律宾接棒老挝成为2017年东盟轮值主席国

东盟经济共同体将着力促进东盟域内货物和人员往来便利化。东盟十国蕴含着前所未有的商业机遇，经济高速发展，市场潜力巨大，拥有近6.3亿的消费人群。随着东盟域内投资贸易规模的不断扩大，该区域的经济发展前景可观：经济发展速度加快、就业率提高、区域价值链形成等等。值得注意的是，目前东盟各成员国之间的交易额仅占地区贸易总额的24%；因此，扩大东盟域内贸易规模，建立服务于东盟市场的经济枢纽，任重而道远。欧盟—东盟贸易投资关系已得到全面确立。东盟是欧盟在欧洲地区以外的第三大贸易伙伴，而欧盟则是东盟的第二大贸易伙伴，仅次于中国。鉴于此，深化东盟区域融合，加强东盟各成员国之间的边境贸易与投资以及加强东盟与欧盟之间的投资贸易合作，意义重大，将使欧洲地区及菲律宾国内的欧盟企业受益良多。值得一提的是，菲律宾将在2017年担任东盟轮值主席国。菲律宾将利用这一绝佳的机会，带领东盟各成员国继续深化东盟经济一体化。

贸易便利化

尽管东盟地区的绝大多数产品享受零关税待遇，或按0～5%的税率缴纳关税，但非关税贸易壁垒仍在很大程度上限制着东盟域内的许多产品交易。因此，通过加强东盟各成员国之间的融合来消除非关税贸易壁垒（尤其是原产地规则、产品标准及检验等），势在必行。在此背景之下，东盟各成员国应统一海关监管流程，并就医疗保健、食品饮料、汽车等重要行业签署标准互认协议。化妆品行业就是体现区域标准化的一个典型案例。菲律宾化妆品行业采用并实施了《东盟食品药物监管指令》中所涵盖的《东盟统一化妆品监管计划协定》等相关规定。

聚焦汽车行业

目前，由于缺少统一的产品标准，菲律宾及东盟地区的汽车行业（包括汽车整车及零配件）的贸易受到诸多非关税贸易壁垒的限制。因此，菲律宾应充分利用2017年担任东盟轮值主席国的机会，实现东盟汽车行业的产品标准向联合国欧洲经济委员会审批流程的相关标准看齐。现在，虽然东盟汽车行业的部分产品标准已达到联合国欧洲经济委员会关于汽车整车的管理规定，但仍有一部分车辆零备件未达到相关要求。菲律宾应以身示范，促使东盟各成员国就汽车行业标准签署互认协议，推进与联合国欧洲经济委员会相关标准相一致的标准化建设。值得注意的是，部分东盟成员国对联合国欧盟经济委员会在汽车零配件方面的标准管理办法表示认可。

东盟“一站式”服务窗口

加快设立综合性强的东盟“一站式”服务窗口，有利于促进东盟边境贸易和域内贸易的发展，最终推动区域经济增长和地区融合。对菲律宾来说，首先要建立一个既具综合性又充满活力的国家级“一站式”在线服务窗口，从而更好地参与东盟“一站式”服务窗口的筹建。

简化海关通关手续，推动域内贸易发展

目前，东盟各成员国仍对彼此之间的海关通关设置了多道关卡，阻碍了东盟域内贸易的发展。菲律宾应与东盟其他成员共同协商，精简优化海关通关作业流程，如采用东盟海关对接系统、实现报关通关电子数据交换等等。近日，根据世界贸易组织《贸易便利化协定》和世界海关组织《京都公约》（修订版）的相关规定，菲律宾颁布了《现代化海关和关税法案》的实施细则，最大程度地简化通关手续。东盟其他国家也可采用该法案，从而推动域内贸易便利化。

保护知识产权，严禁非法贸易

东盟统一市场的形成，扩大了非法贸易和假冒伪劣产品的发展空间。因此，要确保东盟经济体促进域内贸易和投资的发展目标顺利达成，就必须在东盟各成员国之间实现合作机制化。

实施统一的区域标准与法规

除了加强贸易便利化以外，应在东盟区域内确立统一的标准与法规，建立互认机制，以确保投资便利化。制定适用于东盟各成员国的统一标准，对区域价值链的发展和拓展具有决定性作用。《东盟统一化妆品监管计划协定》将会是探索建立统一区域标准与法规的一次有益尝试。

放宽长期性投资约束限制

东盟各成员国需共同制定积极措施，解决投资商在东盟区域内进行长期投资时所关切的问题。菲律宾及其他东盟国家可在新加坡、马来西亚和泰国所达成的协议基础上，举办更多跨境资金募集活动，拓展跨境产品销售渠道，吸引更多跨境投资，同时为中间商进驻东盟市场提供更多便利。

·许志亮 编译

·来源：菲律宾《商业镜报》

Will Anyone in Asia Still Trust America?

By J. Berkshire Miller

At the conclusion of the leaders’summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Peru last week, the Pacif c Rim trade group reasserted the importance of free trade in a joint communiqué. The APEC economies, including the United States, further committed to “keep our markets open and to fight against all forms of protectionism” — an intentional pushback to the growth of protectionist rhetoric, especially from the incoming administration in Washington, D.C.

循证护理学综合了临床最佳的护理经验，针对护理工作中出现的问题，制定可行的护理措施，可避免工作的盲目性，最大程度为患者提供最佳的服务，满足患者疾病康复的需要。随着医学技术不断的进步与完善，患者的治疗需求也越来越高[6-7]，循证护理的实施依据是实事求是，同时也是护理人员保护自身合法权益的有力措施。研究中观察组采用循证护理，护士打破了传统的护理方法，通过查阅文献不断改进护理工作，保证护理工作具有更加科学的证据。综上所述，采用循证护理可有效的降低护理工作者及患者家属护理的工作量，值得临床推广。

President-elect Donald Trump has vowed, most recently in a YouTube video released on November 21, to make America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US-led flagship free trade deal in the Asia-Pacific, a top priority for his administration. Trump’s vitriol has already eliminated any chance that Congress will ratify the pact during the remaining lame-duck period of the current administration.

America’s credibility in the region is already crumbling before the TPP’s off cial burial. The almost certain failure of the deal — at least in its current form— is a body blow to key US allies, especially Japan, and other important states in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam and Singapore, that viewed the deal as the litmus test of Washington’s commitment to Asia. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong put it best on the potential of the TPP failing: “It is your credibility as an ally (that is at stake). How can anyone believe in you any more?”

Indeed, the election of Trump has

rattled US friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific who are worried that the incoming administration might signal Washington’s gradual retreat from the region. The range of concerns among US allies, such as Japan and South Korea, is vast: from the questioning of alliance burden-sharing, to the new administration’s plans for North Korea, or the black box that is Trump’s strategy— or lack thereof — for dealing with China.

But the most critical of these issues is the likely death of the TPP, which sounds the knell for Washington’s wider strategic plans. Specifically, it marks a fatal blow to US President Barack Obama’s “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific. This was a policy grounded on three legs — economic, diplomatic, and security — but the economic foundation, and arguably the most critical strategic element, was the TPP, a 12-country deal that encompasses nearly 40 percent of the world’s gross domestic product. The TPP was meant to bridge the gap and connect Washington’s Asia policy into a long-term strategy, binding the region not only to the United States, but also enhancing regional economic interdependence and cooperation.

The Merlion in Singapore

Rather than relying on the traditional“hub and spoke” model of US engagement in Asia that focuses on bilateral relationships and alliances, the TPP is meant to support a more integrated and overlapping diplomatic and economic network — led by theUnited States — that connects like-minded countries in the region. The prospect of this network was especially enticing for most states in the region. Although they have deep interest in nurturing economic ties with China, they are desperately looking for a hedge to the emerging Sinocentric economic order in the region.

This dissipation of US credibility will be most acute in Southeast Asia, where the TPP originated. The failure of the United States to follow through on its commitments to economically engage with the region will result in weakened relationships. While the United States theoretically has two treaty allies in the region, the Philippines and Thailand (non-TPP members), these relationships are fragile and have become the Achilles’heel of Washington’s security network in Asia due to the emergence of strongman politics in both states —a military junta in Thailand and an erratic nationalist president in the Philippines.

The TPP was important because it targeted less established relationships in Southeast Asia with key emerging states such as Vietnam and Malaysia. Trade was the effective unif er for many states here who craved stronger ties with Washington but did not want to fully join in on containing China. The capital developed through the promise of the TPP helped nurture Washington’s relations with the region – as evidenced by the unprecedented growth in the defense relationship with Vietnam.

None of this is now likely to happen. While Trump’s eventual landing spot on regional security issues remains uncertain, his economic views are clear. He has labelled the reform of international trade policy, including not just the TPP but also the North American Free Trade Agreement, a top priority for his administration.

Most of Trump’s critique on the TPP focuses on its alleged bolstering of Asian economies at the expense of American jobs. This protectionist argument holds little water, considering that higher-paying jobs in US companies are largely supported by Washington’s ability to sell exports overseas. The TPP, in addition to other free trade agreements the United States has in force, would allow the US lower tariffs and barriers to free trade in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. According to an analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the TPP would provide an estimated US$ 131 million increase in real income in the United States by 2030. This would also be complemented by an estimated US$ 357 billion growth in exports by 2030 as a result of a completed pact. In addition to the economic dividends, the TPP differs from other large trade agreements as a result of its commitment to setting a standard for high-level free trade, which took years of grueling negotiations to establish. Essentially, the TPP is intended not just to lower tariff rates and provide market access, but to go the extra mile by insisting on intensive structural and regulatory reforms among the signatories. Many of these commitments for reforms come at a high political cost for US allies, like Japan, and emerging friends in the region, like Vietnam, who are now stuck with a decision on whether to scrap the deal they invested so much time and capital in, or accept a “TPP-lite” without the United States for the foreseeable future.

The step backward on the TPP has re-energised agreements largely led by China, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). While the memberships of the TPP and the RCEP include a large overlap, the most striking difference is the absence of China in the former, and the United States in the latter. Beijing is also likely to push harder on its economic plans for the region by promoting its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road initiative. Beijing may also look to pry away US influence in the region through work to finalise its trilateral trade negotiations with Japan and South Korea. China already inked a bilateral deal with South Korea in 2015. Other possible avenues would be the Free Trade Agreement in the Asia-Pacif c.

The failure of US commitment on the TPP erodes the legacy of Obama’s signature foreign-policy initiative, the rebalance to Asia. It also leads to uncertainty in the region on where to look for leadership. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was originally opposed to the TPP, has ironically become the deal’s most prolific salesman.“Success or failure will sway the direction of the global free-trade system and the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific,” he said. The warning is not just a ploy to stoke fear in Washington, but represents the concerns of many of Washington’s most trusted friends in the region. Trump should consider the consequences.

·Source: The Washington Post