左迺谦 曲世友 刘纪达

摘 要：现阶段，如何有效对作为利益共同体的零售商与制造商实施环境规制策略，并将绿色产销意识融入到供应链管理中，已成为理论界与实业界共同关注的重点问题。本文构建了环境规制绿色产销三方演化博弈模型，分析了各博弈主体的策略稳定性，探究了各博弈主体策略选择的影响机制，并应用仿真分析探讨了环境规制绿色产销博弈系统的演化路径。研究表明：零售商与制造商在策略选择上存在“制约型”策略博弈，加强行政处罚力度、信息公开力度与扶持激励系数有利于零售商与制造商选择绿色产销策略组合，建立引入公众参与的信用监管机制有助于抑制零售商、制造商的非绿色生产经营行为，并将促使环境监管部门采取积极的规制策略。

关键词：环境规制;演化博弈;绿色产销;绿色供应链

中图分类号：F274 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1003-5192（2021）05-0040-08 doi：10.11847/fj.40.5.40

Abstract：At this stage， how to effectively implement environmental regulation strategies for retailers and manufacturers as a community of interests， and integrate green production and marketing awareness into supply chain management， have become a key issue of common concern for the theoretical community and the industry. In order to clarify the dynamic game relationship among environmental regulatory agencies， retailers， and manufacturers in environmental regulation， a tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental regulation green production and marketing is constructed. The strategic stability of each game player is analyzed. And the influence mechanism of each game players strategic choice is explored. Simulation analysis is applied to explore the evolution path of the environmental regulation green production and marketing game system. Research shows that retailers and manufacturers have a “restrictive” strategy game in their strategic choices， strengthening administrative penalties， information disclosure and supporting incentive coefficients are conducive to retailers and manufacturers in choosing a combination of green production and marketing strategies， and will urge environmental supervision departments to adopt proactive regulatory strategies.

Key words：environmental regulation; evolutionary game; green production and marketing; green supply chain

1 引言

近年來发展与污染之间的矛盾日益凸显，我国虽然在环境污染治理问题上已经取得一定成效，但长期来看，社会环境责任问题仍没有引起足够的重视，一些企业一味寻求经济利益的最大化，而忽视在生产经营的过程中对环境造成的伤害。因此，为了解决环境问题，必须进一步加强政府的环境规制。环境规制概念起源于规制理论，是极度自由的市场经济和严苛的政府监管之间平衡的管理方式，在政府的环境规制下，政府和企业之间的利益将产生相互制约关系，分析各个利益相关者之间的博弈行为对提供环境政策引导具有十分重要的意义。……