三方相互体谅讨价还价模型
2020-07-09陶为群



摘 要 对于较重要的三方合作利益分配博弈问题,将相互体谅作为基本遵循并基于适应性预期模型,建立三方相互体谅讨价还价模型.运用这个模型,可以把三方相互体谅讨价还价达成均衡,归结为单调有界数列收敛与常系数非齐次线性差分方程组求解的结合运用.三方相互体谅讨价还价属于不完全信息动态合作博弈.对模型求解,一般地揭示三方相互体谅讨价还价达成均衡的过程与结果,阐明讨价还价有满足初始条件的唯一解和充要条件,以及充要条件的经济含义和数学意义.三方相互体谅讨价还价模型是对于两方相互体谅讨价还价模型的拓展,可以为建立更多方相互体谅讨价还价模型提供借鉴.
关键词 产业经济学;讨价还价;合作博弈;相互体谅;适应性预期
中图分类号 F062.9 文献标识码 A
Abstract For the more important problem of tripartite cooperative game of interest distribution, mutual consideration was taken as the basic principle and based on an adaptive expectation model, a tripartite mutual considerate bargaining model was established. Using this model and according to mathematics, the result that the three players obtained bargain equilibriumaccording to mutual consideration can be concluded as a combination of the convergence of monotone solution series with the solution of a linear difference equations system which is of non-homogeneous constant coefficients variables. By solving the model, the paper generally revealed the process and result about the three parties' bargaining and reaching equilibrium while according to mutual consideration. It also was clarified that there are unique solution and sufficient and necessary conditions satisfying the initial condition, and the economic and mathematical meanings of the necessary and sufficient conditions. The tripartite mutual consideratebargaining model is an extension of the two-party considerate bargaining model, which can provide reference for the establishment ofa bargaining model with more parties according to mutual consideration.
Key words industrcal economics; bargain; cooperation game; considerate each other; adaptive expectation
1 引 言
三方討价还价是在经济与社会生活中常见的一类情形.Kalandrakis(2004)讨论了多数同意规则的三方讨价还价模型并提出和求解了马尔可夫精炼Nash均衡解[1].龚智强等(2015)从合作博弈的角度建立各个局中人地位对称的三方相互威慑讨价还价模型.该模型基于各个局中人都有威慑他方的威慑能力和抵抗他方威慑的受摄能力,设局中人为了取得更大的利益,某两个局中人形成暂时的同盟,同另一个局中人分配利益;然后同盟的两个局中人之间再分配利益;不同同盟下各个局中人有不同的利益分配份额,构成每个局中人的偏向……
