Jing Li

This article documents Jing Li’s interview with Professor Adrian Moore (St Hugh’s College,Oxford;joint editor ofMIND),which briefly reviews Moore’s four monographs and focuses on his promising meta-metaphysics.Moore regards metaphysics as the most general attempt to make sense of things.According to his distinctive,and mild conception of metaphysics,Moore addresses,in turn,the distinction between absolute representations and perspectival representations,the relationship between analytic metaphysics and non-analytic metaphysics,and the correlations between western metaphysics and non-western metaphysics,including,inter alia,Chinese metaphysics.This interview shows that Moore’s meta-metaphysics will be helpful to bridge the traditional gaps not only between analytic metaphysics and non-analytic metaphysics,but between western metaphysics and non-western metaphysics as well—in other words,this novel meta-metaphysics will be useful to form the future world-metaphysics.

Adrian Moore(hereafter AM)is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford and Tutorial Fellow of St Hugh’s College,Oxford.His main areas of interest include:Kant,Wittgenstein,history of philosophy,metaphysics,philosophy of mathematics,philosophy of logic and language,ethics,and philosophy of religion.He is the author ofThe Infinite(Routledge,1990,2001,2019),Points of View(Oxford,1997),Noble in Reason,Infinite in Faculty:Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy(Routledge,2003),andThe Evolution of Modern Metaphysics:Making Sense of Things(Cambridge,2012).He has been the Chairman of the Oxford University Philosophical Society(1995-96),Chairman of the Sub-faculty of Philosophy(1997-99),and President of the Aristotelian Society(2014-15).He is currently a Delegate of the Oxford University Press,Vice-Principal of St Hugh’s College Oxford,and joint editor of the journalMIND.He was awarded the Mind Association Research Fellowship(1999-2000)and a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship(2006-09).

1 Four Monographs

Jing Li[JL]:So far you have published four books,namely,The Infinite(1990,2001,2019)([3]),Points of View(1997)([4]),Noble in Reason,Infinite in Faculty:Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious Philosophy(2003)([5]),andThe Evolution of Modern Metaphysics:Making Sense of Things(2012)([6]).And these books have shown your very broad research areas including Kant,Wittgenstein,history of philosophy,metaphysics,philosophy of mathematics,philosophy of logic and language,ethics,and philosophy of religion.Presumably,the order of the four publications shows some order of the development of your intrinsic philosophizing,right?

Adrian Moore[AM]:Not really.Two of the books that I have published were commissioned.I was invited to publish them.The first book on infinity was part of a Routledge series called“Problems of Philosophy”,and the last book on the evolution of modern metaphysics is part of a Cambridge series called“The Evolution of Modern Philosophy”.The other two books—Points of Viewand the book about Kant—they were books that I decided to write myself because of my philosophical interests.And actually,the very first book that I started to work on wasPoints of View.I had already started on that before Routledge approached me to see if I was interested in writing the book for their series.So the invitations from Routledge and Cambridge University Press interrupted the flow of what I was doing.So you can’t really judge anything from the order in which my books appeared.All you can conclude from these four books is what my general interests are:infinity,Kant,Wittgenstein,metaphysics,and the history of philosophy.The two books that were not commissioned both reflect my interest in Kant.Points of Viewis very closely related to Kant’s metaphysics.The bookNoble in Reason,Infinite in Facultyis about Kant’s ethics and his philosophy of religion.So you can see that Kant has always been a big influence on my work.

JL:Could you tell me which one among the four books is most important to you?

AM:Well,I suppose my own view is that the book that is the best of these four isPoints of View.That’s the one in which I had my most original ideas,and that’s the one in which I accomplished most of what I wanted to do.But I don’t think it has attracted as much attention as the book on infinity or the book on the history of metaphysics.

2 Finite and Infinite

JL:I know that in 2016 you presented a ten-part BBC Radio 4 series entitledA History of the Infinite.1See http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07wr1lz.You say that“the second edition ofThe Infinite(2001)is substantially the same as the first edition(1990)”,so,I’d like to know whether there is some important difference between the second edition and the BBC series.

AM:Yes,I was invited to do that radio series on infinity,and there are some differences between the written work and the radio series.I don’t think they are very important differences.It’s just that the radio series was aimed at a slightly different audience,a non-specialist audience.And so I included some material on cosmology in the radio series that doesn’t come into the book,because most radio listeners would be interested in that sort of thing.So there are some differences as far as subject matter is concerned,but there are no significant differences as far as my views are concerned.I don’t argue for anything in the radio series that I wouldn’t have wanted to argue for when I wrote the book.And a lot of the material in the radio series was taken from the book.Now,as a matter of fact,the most recent thing that I’ve been working on is a third edition of the book on infinity.2The third edition of the book on infinity was published in 2019.The publishers asked me if I was interested in writing this third edition.Now the difference between the first edition and the second edition is trivial.All I did in the second edition was add a new preface,and make some minor changes to the material later in the book.But for the third edition,I am actually adding quite a bit of new material,two new chapters and an appendix,and that will be material that goes beyond the second edition,but also goes beyond the radio series too.It is material mainly about Spinoza and Nietzsche,because I now have much more to say about them than I said in the first edition:I shall also try to relate them to recent continental thinkers,Deleuze in particular.But there will also be some new technical material in the appendix.

JL:You seem to countenance saying that the set of natural numbers is really finite,although you know that this is not Cantor’s own terminology and it is at variance with standard mathematical terminology.But it still seems odd,because according to Cantor,although some infinite sets are bigger than others,and there are many different infinite sets greater than the set of natural numbers,the set of natural numbers itself is definitely infinite.So,could you further explain your deliberate terminological change?

AM:Yes,well,in the book on infinity and in some other articles as well,I suggest that the set of natural numbers is really finite on Cantor’s own showing.Now that’s deliberately paradoxical and deliberately provocative.Obviously Cantor himself would never have said that and it goes against what we normally mean when we used the term“finite”.But what I had in mind was that if you think about theintuitiveidea of infinity,and if you ask most people what they mean by infinity,they’ll say something to the effect that the infinite is what is endless,or boundless,or immeasurable.And if you then look at Cantor’s technical work on infinity,where he distinguishes between all these different infinite sizes,it turns out that the set of natural numbers is the smallest infinite size.So it does have a measure:we can measure how big it is,and we can also say that there are sets that are even bigger.So the idea of immeasurability doesn’t seem to apply,and the ideas of endlessness or boundlessness don’t seem to apply either,because there are bigger infinite sets.And so the intuitive idea of infinity doesn’t seem to apply to the set of natural numbers in Cantor’s theory.And so there is a sense in which he is telling us that the set of natural numbers is limited and finite.It’s not a technical sense,and for me to put it that way is deliberately paradoxical.I’m not recommending that we should actually adopt this new terminology.If a mathematician said that the set of natural numbers was really finite,that would be very misleading.But even so,I do think what Cantor is doing is providing us with a sense in which the natural numbers are really finite.

JL:You define the formula“Ais shown thatx”as thatAhas inexpressible knowledge,and if an attempt were made to express this knowledge,then the result would be:x.This allows us to say that we are shown that the infinite exists.But it does not follow that the infinite does exist.And the fact that we have such inexpressible knowledge shows our own finitude,our human finitude,especially our temporal finitude,as marked by our death.And you mention that“Heidegger was profoundly concerned with human finitude,temporality,and death”.Thus you and Heidegger share some important concerns.To what extent,then,have you been influenced by Heidegger? What’s the relationship between Heidegger and you?

AM:This is a question about showing and about Heidegger.Now,I have my own particular definition of“Ais shown thatx”which is inspired by Wittgenstein’sTractatus,but it’s not supposed to be taken straight from theTractatus.I’m not claiming that this is how Wittgenstein uses the expression.The idea is that sometimes we have inexpressible knowledge,and sometimes when we have inexpressible knowledge there is such a thing as what would happen if we tried to express it.So,on my definition,“Ais shown thatx”means thatAhas inexpressible knowledge,and if there were an attempt to express this knowledge,then the result would be:x.And what you put in place of“x”there can be complete nonsense.Now,I do believe that you find something a bit like that in Heidegger,because there are places where it looks as if Heidegger is sympathetic to the idea of inexpressibility.And there are places where it also looks as if he’s trying to express these things that are inexpressible.And he has various devices that he uses,which show that he’s not using language in the normal way.So,for example,he sometimes writes words and crosses them out.When you’re reading what he has written on the page,you see the word,but you also see the crossing out.And you know that in some way you’re supposed to be treating the word as having its normal meaning,but in other ways you are supposed to be disregarding that meaning.So Heidegger is using language in strange and unorthodox ways.And I think that reflects the fact that he’s trying to express inexpressible knowledge.So yes,I think there is a connection with Heidegger.Whether Heidegger himself would put it in those terms is a further question.It may be that Heidegger wouldn’t agree that there is this connection.So I’m not saying that this is Heidegger’s own view of the matter.

JL:So can we say that your thoughts about human finitude,temporality,and death have been directly influenced by Heidegger?

AM:Yes,that’s right.That’s another point of connection,and possibly it’s the same point of connection,although that is a further question.I am thinking about the way in which Heidegger seems to be concerned with ineffability when he’s concerned with death.For the point where Heidegger seems to be closest to the idea of ineffability is the point at which he talks about nothingness.But he is close when he talks about Being too.For he wants to deny that Being is an entity.But on the other hand,the very fact that he’s talking about it suggests that it is an entity.And similarly when he talks about nothingness.He wants to deny that that is an entity,but here he is talking about it.So you’ve got that same sense of contradiction and of inexpressibility in those cases.Does that relate to human finitude,temporality,and death? Well,yes,it does.But obviously this is a massive topic.

3 Absolute Representation and Perspectival Representation

JL:In yourPoints of View,you try to mount a bold defence of the idea that it is possible to think about the world“from no point of view”.You distinguish between an“absolute”representation and a“perspectival”representation.([4],“Chapter one’s Abstract”)But it doesn’t seem easy to distinguish between the two sharply,and,for some people,it is very difficult to imagine an absolute representation.Would you like to give some defence of your view?

AM:Yes,I’ve got this distinction between absolute representations and perspectival representations,and a lot of people are suspicious of the idea of an absolute representation.An absolute representation is one that is not supposed to involve any kind of perspective or subjectivity,and there are some people who think that such a thing is impossible.There are some people who would say:“Look! The very fact that you’re representing things means that you’re already approaching them from a particular perspective.The sheer fact that you’re using concepts means that you’re introducing an element of perspective.”A lot of people would say that.Now the problem is that,although youcansay that,it then just becomes trivial that there are no such things as absolute representations.So if it’s going to be an interesting question whether there are such things or not,we need to understand representation in such a way that it does not count as perspectival just because it involves the use of concepts.So one of the things that I’m trying to do in my bookPoints of Viewis not just to answer the question whether absolute representations are possible,but also to clarify the question what we mean by absolute representations,and,in particular,to clarify it in such a way that the question whether absolute representations are possible becomes an interesting question.Now this is very heavily reliant on Bernard Williams’s work,because the main issue is one that comes out in Williams’s book on Descartes([10]).He introduced the idea of an absolute conception of reality.So really I’m trying to extend Bernard Williams’s ideas and also trying to defend his ideas,because he believes in the possibility of an absolute conception of reality.I don’t know how helpfully I can summarize the view in this context,but both Bernard Williams and I try to define the absolute in such a way that it’s an interesting question whether there can be absolute representations or not,andwe both think that there can,and we both think that science is the place where you should expect to find them.It may be that scientists haven’t succeeded in producing absolute representations so far,but that’s the kind of thing that they are trying to do.They’re trying to describe the world in a way that is not dependent on our human perspective.Think of it like this:if we met aliens from another planet,we wouldn’t expect their music to be the same as ours,if indeed they listen to music at all(that will depend on whether they use sounds in the same way as we do to create art).But if they do—if they’ve got some equivalent of our music—we still wouldn’t expect that it would be the same as ours.But we might expect that their science would be the same as ours,if their technology is very sophisticated,which presumably it is if they’ve actually managed to travel to the planet earth.And indeed maybe we could learn from their science.Maybe their science is much more sophisticated than ours.But anyway it’s not just science from a human point of view versus science from an alien point of view,whereas in the case of music or literature,other things that human beings create,perhaps these do express things from a human point of view.And of course there can be even more specific perspective than that.I have in mindcultural differencesbetween human beings which introduce further elements of perspective.

JL:Presumably,according to Kant,humans and aliens might have very differenttranscendental logical forms,in such a way that they would have different sciences?

AM:Yes,that’s absolutely right.And therefore one of the things that I am doing here is disagreeing with Kant.And indeed one of the chapters in my bookPoints of Viewexplains why.But you’re absolutely right:Kant does think that science is from a point of view.This may be a human point of view,but it may not be.It may be something that we share with other creatures.Nevertheless,for Kant,science is from a point of view because of the categories that we use,and also because it’s concerned with the world of space and time.Kant thinks that space and time area prioriintuitions that we contribute to our experiences,and he allows for the possibility that they are not shared by all creatures.So I am disagreeing with Kant,and Bernard Williams would want to disagree with Kant as well.If we do think that science can produce absolute representations,we have to think that Kant is wrong.And I try to explain why I think he is wrong in my bookPoints of View.

JL:Your main question in this book is:“Are absolute representations possible?”And indeed,you give a positive answer to this question.Your answer is established by“the Basic Argument”,and this argument has as one of its premises“the Basic Assumption”,which is that“representations are representations of what is there anyway.”It seems that you very sharply distinguish between representations and what are represented.And,accordingly,you argue that“the absolute/ perspectival distinction applies exclusively to representations,not to what is represented.”But how is such a sharp distinction between representations and what is represented possible?Presumably,there is no sharp border or line between them.For example,what is represented does comprise some representations,andvice versa.In other words,what is represented cannot be independent of the related representation that represents it.Can you further explain your position?

AM:One of the very basic ideas in the bookPoints of Viewis another idea that I get from Bernard Williams,the idea that representations are representations of what is there anyway.His point was that,on the one hand,you’ve got reality,and,on the other hand,you’ve got our ideas about reality.Now you say,“Yes,but this isn’t a very sharp distinction,because after all reality contains us and sometimes we might want to think about ourselves and about our own representations.”And after all that’s what I’m doing in the bookPoints of View.So,is it possible to have this sharp divide between reality and representations of reality? Well,I agree with Bernard Williams.If you go back to his book on Descartes,and if you look at the point where he first introduces the idea that representations are representations of what is there anyway,you will see that he makes allowances for the case where you’re talking about human beings and their experiences and other psychological items.So,yes,reality itself contains representations.But the crucial thing is that,when you distinguish between what’s absolute and what’s perspectival,that is a distinction that applies because things are being represented,but it’s a distinction that applies to the representations,not to what is being represented.It may be that what is being represented is itself a representation,so that what is being represented is either absolute or perspectival in that special case.But that’s only because it is a representation.What is represented won’t be either absolute or perspectival except in such a special case.If you think about tense,for example—that is,past,present,and future—there have been debates about whether this is part of reality.And I think those debates are confused,because we have to realize that past,present,and future are just features of how we represent reality:they’re part of the perspective of some of our representations.Some of our representations are from a temporal point of view.So we can say that 28thof August lies in the past,because today is 29thof August and we’re speaking from a particular temporal point of view.But when we say that 28thlies in the past,its pastness is not an intrinsic feature of it:28this only past from certain points of view(on 27thit was future).And that’s a matter of how we now represent it.So if somebody asks:“Is reality itself absolute?”,my answer,and I think Bernard Williams’s answer as well,would be that that’s a bad question.

4 Kant

JL:Obviously,you have been influenced by Kant,for instance in the main questions of your two booksPoints of ViewandNoble in Reason,Infinite in Faculty:“Are absolute representations possible?”and“Is it possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason?”According to my understanding,in some sense you give the same positive answer to them.And it seems that we can arguably change them into new questions:“How are absolute representations possible?”and“How is it possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason?”.Accordingly,both become Kantian questions,or in other words,variations on Kant’s main questions,namely,“How is metaphysics of nature possible as science?”and“How is metaphysics of morals possible as science?”Would you like to say more about the relationship between you and Kant?

AM:Yes,so two of my books are very influenced by Kant.InPoints of ViewI’m concerned with questions about Kant’s metaphysics;inNoble in Reason,Infinite in FacultyI’m concerned with questions about Kant’s ethics.And you are suggesting that perhaps my books are even more Kantian than I indicate,because,once I’ve given a positive answer to the question“Are absolute representations possible?”and to the question“Is it possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason?”,there’s then the further Kantian question:“How is this possible?”.And I agree,there is a further Kantian question in both cases.But there is one important qualification.The question that I raise inPoints of Viewis“Are absolute representations possible?”,and I do give a positive answer to that question,as we’ve just been discussing.The question that I raise in the ethics book is“Is it possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason?”Now you have suggested that I give a positive answer to that question as well.In that case it is not quite so clear,because actually I’m suspicious of the idea of“pure reason”.And so one of the things that I try to do in that book is to call into doubt the very idea of pure reason.I think reason is partly conditioned bycultural factorsand suchlike.So I do think that there’s an element of ethical thinking that depends on reason,but I don’t think that there’s an element of ethical thinking that depends on pure reason.So actually my answer to both of these questions is somewhat non-Kantian.I depart from Kant in both cases,definitely as far as the first question is concerned,but also to some extent as far as the second question is concerned.But I agree with you there is then the further Kantian question“How is this possible?”.

5 Wittgenstein

JL:In addition to Kant,you are also extremely interested in Wittgenstein.Arguably,they do share many very basic similarities,for example,their metaphysics(especially that of the early Wittgenstein3See Adrian Moore,“7.Transcendental idealism in the Tractatus”in[6,Ch.IX]and“4.Transcendental idealism in the later work?”in[6,Ch.X]..)are both versions oftranscendental idealismin some sense.Would you want to say more about this?

AM:Yes,I’m very interested in both Kant and Wittgenstein,and I do think that there are some very interesting similarities between them.In particular,I do think that in the early Wittgenstein you can see a kind of transcendental idealism.But you see it only very indirectly.This goes back to the idea that we considered earlier of“Ais shown thatx”.I think that,in theTractatus,we find something like the idea that we are shown that transcendental idealism is correct.What that means is that we have inexpressible knowledge,and if we try to express it we produce transcendental idealism.But this is not a vindication of transcendental idealism,because the whole point is that what we come out with may just be nonsense.It’s an attempt to express something that’s inexpressible.There can be no suggestion,therefore,that the attempt is going to be successful.So this is a similarity between Kant and Wittgenstein,but it’s a very subtle similarity,and it’s a very indirect one.And there is something even more subtle,and even more indirect,in the case of the later Wittgenstein where there isn’t even an indirect commitment to transcendental idealism,although I do think that there are elements in the later work that make transcendental idealism attractive.And that’s something else that I borrow from Bernard Williams.But Wittgenstein himself gives us ways of resisting the attractions.

JL:There are two new influential and controversial ways of re-interpreting Wittgenstein in the past twenty years,namely,“the New Wittgenstein”([1])and“the Third Wittgenstein”([8]).In your latest bookThe Evolution of Modern Metaphysics,you address the New Wittgenstein,that is the Wittgenstein who emerges from“the new reading”.And,according to my understanding,you prefer“the traditional reading”,although you make clear that you are pursuing a way of combining the two readings,that is,you argue that each is entirely consonant with the other.Would you like to say more about this? And what do you think of“the Third Wittgenstein”? Do you agree that there is a sharp distinction between Wittgenstein’sPhilosophical InvestigationsandOn Certainty?

AM:Ah yes,these are questions about the different stages in Wittgenstein’s career and how we should understand them.As far as the early Wittgenstein is concerned,there’s this recent debate between the so-called traditional reading and the socalled new reading.And you have suggested that I prefer the traditional reading.But Idon’tthink that is correct,actually.I’ve got a lot of sympathy for the new reading.I think there are some very important insights in the new reading.And what I have tried to do in my work is to suggest that the two readings(insofar as we can think of them as two clearly defined readings)can be combined:we don’t have to think that there is a simple choice between these two readings.There are insights that they both have to offer,and there is a way of reading theTractatusthat incorporates the insights of both.But there is a distinction between Wittgenstein’s early work and his later work,and almost everybody recognizes that distinction.Even though there are important continuities,there are some very significant differences as well.However,a number of commentators have recently suggested there are not just the early Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein,there are actually three Wittgensteins,the early Wittgenstein,the later Wittgenstein,and then the third Wittgenstein.And what these people have in mind is the very late workOn Certainty,where you find something that is even different from theInvestigations.Now I’m suspicious of that,I must admit.I don’t deny that there are important new things going on inOn Certainty.But I think that,once you suggest that there’s a third Wittgenstein,the question then is where to stop.By the time you’ve got three,it can only be a question of time before you’ve got seven or eight or something like that.You can distinguish many different phases.And of course,it is interesting to compare what Wittgenstein is doing at different points in his philosophical career,for instance in his intermediate work between theTractatusand theInvestigations.But I can’t myself see a good argument for stopping at three:it’s either two or it’s a lot.And the most significant difference of all still seems to me to be the basic difference between the early work and the later work.So I’m not very sympathetic to the idea of“the Third Wittgenstein”.

6 Metaphysics as the Most General Attempt to Make Sense of Things

JL:According to your own terminology,Heidegger is a“metaphysician”,because in some sense,he tries to make maximally general sense of things.Although personally,I very much appreciate your distinctive broad understanding or use of the terms“metaphysics”and“metaphysician”,it is well known that Heidegger is always trying to“overcome metaphysics”,leaping from“the first Beginning”to“the other Beginning”,with meta-metaphysical“thinking”or“poeticizing”.What do you have to say about such terminological differences?

AM:Thisisjust a point about terminology,I think.In my book on metaphysics,I give a very idiosyncratic definition of metaphysics.I define metaphysics as the most general attempt to make sense of things,and that’s deliberately meant to be very broad.And I do realize that a lot of people use the word“metaphysics”in different ways.I end up classifying people as metaphysicians,even though they wouldn’t classify themselves as metaphysicians,because this is not how they understand the word“metaphysics”.Heidegger is an example.It seems clear to me that he’s interested in trying to make sense of things at the most general level.So,by my definition,he does count as a metaphysician.But he uses the word“metaphysics”in his own different way,and sometimes,I think,when he uses the word“metaphysics”,he has in mind what we might calltraditionalmetaphysics,and he wants to escape from that.So he doesn’t want to be classified as a metaphysician in those terms.And that’s fine,as far as I’m concerned.That just shows that the word is being used in different ways:it is really just a matter of terminology.And part of what Heidegger is trying to overcome is the metaphysics ofpresence,the idea that Being is to be understood in terms of what’s present to consciousness.And the other thing that you find in the tradition is the polar opposite of that,a concern with what istranscendent.Heidegger is suspicious of the transcendent as well,because he is a phenomenologist,and he is interested in how things are given to us;and the transcendent isn’t really given to us at all.So there are a lot of things in the tradition of metaphysics that he is opposed to.But he still counts as a metaphysician in my sense.

JL:So your sense of metaphysics isbroaderthan Heidegger’s?

AM:Yes,that’s right.

JL:And you argue that Heidegger failed in overcoming metaphysics?

AM:Well,not necessarily.I think he does help us to overcome metaphysics in his sense,just because he is still doing metaphysics in my sense.This doesn’t mean that his project is a failure.Theremaybe reasons to think that his project fails,but in the chapter on Heidegger of my book I am actually quite sympathetic to a lot of what he does.I think he is one of the great philosophers.

JL:By the way,are you anaturalistphilosopher?

AM:Yes,I suppose so.I am suspicious of the idea of what is transcendent.But it does depend on what you mean by“naturalism”.Sometimes when people say that they are naturalists,they mean that the only really good way of making sense of things is by using the methods of the natural sciences,and I definitely disagree with that.So I am not a naturalist in that sense.Science is just one way of making sense of things.That goes back to the earlier question about whether the distinction between the absolute and the perspectival is a matter of better or worse.No,it is not.

JL:It seems that your definition of metaphysics,as“the most general attempt to make sense of things”,allows for some of the most interesting and profoundest insights of phenomenology(in a very broad sense).For example,Heidegger has defined phenomenology as“Das was sich zeigt,so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt,von ihm selbst her sehen lassen.(To let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.)”([2,S.34]),in short,“to let something show itself”.If I am right,do you think this shows some very interesting bridgeable correlations between the analytic tradition in philosophy and non-analytic traditions(especially phenomenology)? What do you think about this?

AM:Yes,well,if you define metaphysics in the way that I do as the most general attempt to make sense of things,then there are obvious connections with phenomenology.Phenomenology is concerned with making sense of making sense of things.A phenomenologist will ask“How do we make sense of things?”And my own view is that anyone trying to make sense of things at the highest level of generality will be interested in the question“How do we make sense of things?”.So metaphysics does have this reflexive element,and therefore I do think that there are connections between metaphysics—as I understand it—and phenomenology.And all the great phenomenologists will count as metaphysicians in my terms.So I do think that should help to create a bridge between the analytic tradition and various non-analytic traditions,because we ought to realize that people in these traditions are doing very similar things.And that’s one reason why I think it’s a shame that there is so little contact between these traditions.What I was trying to do in that book on metaphysics was to indicate ways in which philosophers in these different traditions are addressing the same questions and very often giving the same answers as well.

JL:I do agree with you.I know you as well have a very special interest in the work of Bernard Williams who was one of your colleagues at Cambridge and about whom you write extensively.And in the conclusion of yourThe Evolution of Modern Metaphysics,you also say that one of your most important conclusions of this book—that“metaphysics is a humanistic discipline,rather than a science”—is influenced by Bernard Williams([9]).Can you explain more about why he is so important to you?

AM:Yes,well,Bernard Williams has been a big influence on me.I’ve already mentioned him a number of times in these answers that I’ve been giving.But in particular one of the things that Bernard Williams wanted to argue was that philosophy was a humanistic discipline,rather than a science,and I strongly agree with that.And I would say the same,more specifically,about metaphysics.Metaphysics—as I understand it—is the heart of philosophy.So if philosophy is a humanistic discipline,then it will follow that metaphysics is a humanistic discipline as well.And that goes back to the discussion that we were having earlier.Bernard Williams is one of the people who argues for the possibility of absolute representations.But he also argues that science is the place to look for absolute representations.This doesn’t mean that he thinks that science is superior to any other discipline,and it doesn’t mean that he thinks that science is superior to philosophy,nor that philosophy should be trying to produce absolute representations.They are different:they’re doing different things.So philosophy or metaphysics is a humanistic discipline:that is to say,when you’re doing philosophy or when you’re doing metaphysics,you’re trying to make sense of things from a human point of view.And one of the objections that I have to a lot of analytic philosophers is that they proceed as if they were scientists:they try,in effect,to produce absolute representations.

JL:As you say,Collingwood is very special:he neither belongs to the analytic tradition nor belongs to the non-analytic ones you consider in your book on metaphysics.Why is he so important to you? Collingwood sees metaphysics as a part of history.In my view,he shares this insight with Karl Marx.But Marx does not seem so important to you.Why?

AM:Yes,I had a chapter in my book on Collingwood,partly just because he had such an unusual view.He believes that metaphysics is a branch of history,and that is an unusual view.I thought it was important to include him in my book,just because his view was unlike anything else that I considered in the book:it was also a chance to compare that view with the various other views that I was considering.But you then raise the question“What about Marx?”,and actually one of the things that I would like to have done would have been to say much more about Marxist philosophy.There’s almost no discussion of Marx in my book.But it’s not because I don’t find Marx interesting,and it is definitely not because I don’t think that Marx is important.It’s just because I don’t know as much about Marx.And it was already quite a fat book! If I had included a chapter on Marx or other Marxist thinkers,that would have added quite a lot of material.I had to make various decisions about material that I was going to leave out.But it would be interesting at some point for me to look in more detail at Marx’s views,and to try to relate them to the rest of what I was doing.

JL:So do you have some plan to publish a second edition ofThe Evolution of Modern Metaphysics? Will you add some chapters on other philosophers?

AM:There is no plan to do that,and I don’t know whether the publishers would be interested in it or not.But,if they did at any point suggest it,I would give it serious thought,and I suppose actually one of the things that I would be interested in doing would be adding some material on Marx.

JL:You say:“according to Bernard Williams’s criteria,Deleuze is certainly one of the greatest philosophers (in the history of philosophy).”([6,p.1109])Probably for many philosophers,it’s very difficult to imagine that an analytic philosopher like you should appreciate Deleuze so much! Would you like to explain this more?

AM:Deleuze is somebody else that I discuss in my book,and I do find Deleuze fascinating.Now a lot of analytic philosophers either just don’t know his work at all,or are familiar with some of it but are rather dismissive of it:they just don’t think it is a good philosophy.Now I think that may be because they look at the wrong things.For an analytic philosopher trying to come to terms with Deleuze,the best books to start with are his own historical works:he does really interesting and really impressive history of philosophy.And those historical books are the most accessible to an analytic philosopher.In particular,if an analytic philosopher were to start with Deleuze’s work on Spinoza,I think they would find it very accessible.They might even think that it had been written by an analytic philosopher:it has that same attention to detail,it elaborates arguments in the same way,it proceeds in a very discursive kind of way.An analytic philosopher reading the book on Spinoza would not find it at all alien.And,if they found it interesting and helpful on Spinoza,then I think that they could begin to look at some of Deleuze’s other works and that they would find these more accessible as well.But it was very important for me to include this chapter on Deleuze,because I do think that he is an extremely important philosopher.And in the book I am trying to get analytic philosophers to understand some more about the continental tradition,and to try to be more sympathetic to the continental tradition.

7 Analytic Metaphysics and Non-Analytic Metaphysics

JL:So,I should say that yourmethodologyis absolutely analytic?

AM:Yes,I never tried to pretend otherwise.If somebody asks me what sort of philosopher I am,the answer that I would always give is:an analytic philosopher.That’s how I’ve been trained;that was the kind of philosophy that I was first exposed to;that’s the kind of philosophy that I write;that’s the kind of philosophy that I am comfortable writing.I couldn’t do it in any other way.So I am myself an analytic philosopher.And I agree that there is a difference between analytic philosophy and other kinds of philosophy.It is not that I don’t think there’s any difference,then.But what I do think is that there shouldn’t be an opposition between them,and that analytic philosophers have a lot to learn from non-analytic philosophers.

JL:So,as an analytic metaphysician,why are you so interested in the nonanalytic traditions? As an analytic philosopher,can you promise that you are able to understand the non-analytic traditions correctly? Will there be some inevitable basic conflicts between their two different methodologies?

AM:Yes,there are some important differences.In particular,there are some important stylistic differences.The non-analytic traditions in western philosophy are more interested in the relationship between philosophy and thearts,whereas in the analytic tradition,there’s more interest in the relationship between philosophy and thesciences.And so in non-analytic traditions,you get less of an attempt to write in a scientific kind of way.And actually,I think that’s good,because I do think that philosophy is different from science.But analytic philosophy is concerned withclarity,and I think that’s good too.I think analytic philosophy should not stop trying to be clear,because it is helpful if you can write clearly and if you can present your ideas clearly.And very often in non-analytic philosophy there isn’t the same clarity.And that’s a problem:non-analytic philosophy suffers as a result.Are there conflicts between the two methodologies? Well,you can’t really do both things at once,but the two traditions can work alongside each other,and in that sense I think they don’t conflict with each other.

JL:Sometimes,it looks as though some continental philosophers prefer doing philosophy in a deliberatelyobscureway,rather than in aclearway.Right?

AM:Yes,sometimes it’s deliberate and sometimes you can understand what they’re trying to achieve.And we should be sympathetic to the possibility that sometimes clarity isnotwhat is required.But very often non-analytic philosophy is obscure in a way that it needn’t be,and that is a problem.And that is one respect in which analytic philosophy is superior to non-analytic philosophy,I think,because analytic philosophers do try to be clear where it is important to be clear.Of course they don’t always succeed.But at least they try in a way that non-analytic philosophers sometimes don’t.

8 Western Metaphysics and Non-Western Metaphysics

JL:It seems that your term“metaphysics”(making sense of things at the highest level of generality)is used or understood in the broadest,softest,or most flexible way.So can I reasonably think that all the non-western traditions as well have their own respective metaphysics?

AM:Yes.My problem with non-western traditions is the same as my problem with Marx.I’ve written nothing about non-western traditions,not through lack of interest in them,but simply because I don’t know enough about eastern philosophy.The little bit that I do know I find absolutely fascinating.And,as with the relationship between analytic philosophy and non-analytic philosophy,I think there are some really interesting connections with what westerners do.Eastern philosophy and western philosophy,I’m sure,have a lot to learn from each other.So one of the things that I would like to do is to learn a lot more about eastern philosophy.I’ve had a little bit of exposure to eastern philosophy when I’ve taught philosophy in China.I’ve been involved in some summer schools in China,teaching western philosophy to Chinese scholars.In some of my discussions of western philosophy with Chinese scholars,I’ve learned a bit about eastern philosophy.I would love to know more.

JL:Do you think there should beonemetaphysics ormore than onemetaphysics? How do you understand the relationship between the western tradition and other traditions? What do you think are the prospects for world philosophy? Are you pessimistic or optimistic about it?

AM:I don’t think that there should just be one way of doing metaphysics.If metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things,then there are all sorts of different methodologies and ways of doing it.That’s partly because it’s unlike science:we shouldn’t expect everybody to converge on the same answers,or even the same methodologies.But I’m optimistic rather than pessimistic,because I believe that all these different ways of approaching metaphysics can be brought intoharmonywith each other.I don’t think they need to be in conflict with each other,and if you have all sorts of different interesting ways of trying to make sense of things,involving different parts of the human perspective,then that’s got to be interesting and it’s got to be helpful for each to learn from the others.

JL:Could you briefly introduce your plan of future researches or publications?For instance,your fifth book?

AM:What I’m working on at the moment is the third edition of my book on infinity.I don’t at this stage have a plan for a new book except that there is going to be a collection of my essays coming out4The collection was entitled Language,World,and Limits:Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics.([7]),and I will have to do a little bit of work on that,because I’ll be writing an introduction.But at the moment I’m not absolutely sure what I’ll do next after the third edition of TheInfiniteand after this collection of essays.

JL:You are now one of the two co-editors ofMIND.According to its own website,MINDaims to take quality to be the sole criterion of publication,with no area of philosophy,no style of philosophy,and no school of philosophy excluded.Can you further explain such an aim? Is it possible to publish an article mainly concerned with Confucianism or Daoism or Zen Buddhism inMIND? And would you like to give some advice to Chinese philosophers about submitting their papers to this great journal?

AM:Yes,I’ve been editing the journalMINDwith Lucy O’Brien.She is a philosopher at University College London,and actually she is also a former student of mine.I taught her when she was doing her doctorate.And we would love to make the journal as broad as possible.It hasn’t included work in eastern philosophy,but we would definitely be interested in publishing material in eastern philosophy.We have had some submissions in this area since we took over,although we haven’t had any that we’ve accepted for publication.But we’re certainly interested in work in eastern philosophy,just as we’re interested in work in continental philosophy.We would like to publish work inallareas of philosophy.So if anybody has got work that they’re interested in submitting toMIND,they shouldn’t be discouraged just becauseMINDhasn’t published that sort of philosophy before.The problem about getting published in MIND is not one of area or subject matter.The problem,unfortunately,is the very fierce competition.We are only able to publish about 3%or 4%of what is submitted.So if Chinese philosophers are interested in publishing inMIND,that’s fine,but they shouldn’t be under any illusions about how difficult it is to have submissions accepted.And if they submit material which is rejected,they should remember that 96%or 97%of what is submitted is rejected.

JL:So far,have some Chinese philosophers succeeded?

AM:Not writing about Chinese philosophy.Of course there are Chinese philosophers who work in the analytic tradition.

JL:Professor Adrian Moore,thank you very much for the above talk.