苏德超 张稆元

摘 要：自由意志问题，尤其是自由与被决定是否相容的问题，是西方哲学中的一个经典难题。刘清平试图通过阐述人性逻辑来回答这一问题。他认为，按人性逻辑行事，即为自由；而人性逻辑具有强制必然性，故而自由与被决定并不冲突。同时，由于人只能按人性逻辑行事，外在物理世界的因果必然与随机偶然就跟人的自由并不相干，人的责任将无从推脱。但是，在他那里，自由的真实性是被假定的，并没有得到论证。事实上，人性逻辑并不一定带来自由，就算能，它的强制性也并非不能逃脱；外部世界的特征跟人的行动密切相关而非毫不相干。因此，刘清平对问题的回答并不成功。自由意志问题跟一系列哲学问题交织在一起，依然是一个谜。

关键词：自由意志；人性逻辑；随机偶然；必然；责任

中图分类号：B01

文献标识码：A

文章编号：1000-5099（2018）01-0013-11

Abstract：The problem of free will， especially whether freedom and being determined are compatible， is a classic conundrum in western philosophy. Liu Qingping， in his articals， tried a new solution by elaborating the inner logic of human nature. He believes that freedom means acting according to the inner logic of human nature； and that such logic has in itself the force of necessity， and thus freedom is not in conflict with decidedness or being determined. Meanwhile， since human beings can only act according to the inner logic of human nature， the causal necessity and chanciness of the external physical world would not necessarily affect human freedom， and thus human responsibility cannot be shirked. However， in Lius theories， the authenticity of freedom is hypothetical， as well as uncorroborated. In fact， the inner logic of human nature does not necessarily bring freedom， and even if it does， its compulsion is not unescapable. Rather than being irrelevant， the characteristics of the external world are closely related to human actions. Therefore， Liu Qingpings solution to the problem was not successful. The mystery of free will， intertwined with a series of philosophical problems， remains a mystery.

Key words：free will； the inner logic of human nature； chanciness； necessity； duty

自由意志問题是西方哲学的核心问题之一，两千多年来歧见纷出。尤其自由与被决定是否相容的问题，到今天为止，并没有一个公认的答案。2017年以来，刘清平教授发表了一系列文章，试图帮助西方哲学走出这座“怎么走也走不出的迷宫”[1]41，或者说，“摆脱这场历史悠久的理论噩梦”[2]12。在系列文章里，刘清平认为，西方哲学之所以陷入自由困局，是因为西方哲学家混淆了概念，特别是将自由随意混同于随机偶然，这导致自由任意跟因果必然对立，并进而将外在必然（“是”）混同于主观必须（“应当”），如此就陷入到要么没有因果必然、要么失去自由的尴尬。……