ZHENG CHUNRONG

Professor and Director, Institute for German Studies/Institute for EU Studies, Tongji University

IMPACTED BY RIGHT-WING POPULISM, WITHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

ZHENG CHUNRONG

Professor and Director, Institute for German Studies/Institute for EU Studies, Tongji University

2017 is an election year for Europe, also a year on which hinges the destiny of Europe. In view of the general rise of right-wing populist parties in the EU, there have been concerns if another “black swan” would fly out of the general elections of the Netherland, France and Germany. To date, the Dutch and French elections have turned out to be more threatening than dangerous. In addition, it is expected that in the general election of Germany, it is impossible for the right-wing populist parties to make a big storm there. Therefore, for some of the people it is a relief that the EU will continue to “kick the can down the road” as it always has. In fact, the EU has only escaped a major disaster and many problems it faces have not gone. The right-wing populist parties continue to gather energy and their comeback somewhere down the road cannot be ruled out. As such, it remains imperative for the EU to seek remedies for its existing problems in internal and external security and imbalance of economic and social development. Though the conception of “multi-speed Europe” has enabled countries wishing to push integration forward in some of the policy areas to take the lead and get rid of trammels and obstruction by very few countries, it has also brought to the EU problems such as being more complex, less than transparent and detached from the general public.

IMPACT OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST FORCES WITHIN THE EU

Impacted by continuous shocks of multiple crises of Euro debt, refugees, terrorism and the Brexit, Euroscepticism and anti-EU sentiments with the EU are on upsurge. The EU is no longer considered solution to problems but source of them. It was due to the outlet of such a perception and sentiments that the Leave camp won by a narrow margin of 51.9 percent of the vote in the Brexit referendum of June 23, 2016.

Within the Leave camp, the rightwing populist British Independence Party no doubt played a role of adding fuel to the flame. Its policy proposals against immigrants from the outside and for exiting the EU played up to the demand of “nobodies” at lower strata of the society who, in reality or imagination, did not benefit from the process of European integration.

Judging by policy positions, there is little difference between the British Independence Party and right-wing populist parties in other EU countries. The latter, in general, stand against immigrants, particularly Islamic ones and call for a referendum on leaving or staying in the EU following the British example. In the British politics, limited by the electoral system (simple majority in a single district), the British Independence Party is a small party with only a few seats. However, in other EU countries there is a real possibility for right-wing populist parties to be in government and turn their anti-EU positions into actual policies and actions. It was precisely because of this that the Dutch and French general elections held earlies in the year of 2017 innerved the Europhiles throughout the EU.

Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron promised to work together to deepen EU integration and reinforce the Eurozone as the new French president visited Germany , May 15,2017.

Eventually pro-EU parties won both of the elections, which turned out to be more threatening than dangerous. However, it is no doubt premature to conclude that right-wing populist parties are a spent force now. In the general elections of the Netherland on March 25, 2017, the pre-election favorite the Party for Freedom, a right-wing populist party led by Wilders secured 20 seats only. However, it is worth noting that the Party for Freedom gained 5 more seats this time around than the previous election, becoming the largest opposition party in parliament. Not only did its growth in strength make the situation more complicated for organizing a cabinet but also makes the party a greater force in checking the new government of the Netherland. In France, though Ms. Marine Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing party the National Front lost in the second vote of presidential election to Mr. Emmanuel Macron, leader of the En Marche!, a party that is “neither left nor right”, her performance for the second round with 35 percent of the vote was far better than her father’s in 2002 (18 percent). No matter what comes out of France’s parliamentary elections, judging by the process of two rounds of presidential voting, France is more divided than ever before. Therefore, if the coalition under Prime Minister Mark Rutte yet to come about with difficulty does not perform well or if President Macron does not have the power to push forward reform or does not do well with reform, then the right-wing populist parties will surely make a comeback in the next elections. Besides, in order to win more popular support and avoid being forced out by collective efforts of mainstream parties, some of the extreme right-wing or right-wing populist parties seek to return to more practical politics, moving their policy positions moderately to the center. For instance, Ms. Le Pen has, over the past few years, made an endeavor to “de-demonize” the National Front. As for the mainstream parties, in order to regain “protest voters” they lost to the right-wing populist parties, they have leant to the right more or less. However, it is questionableif it works every time to replicate the positions of the right-wing populist parties. Because the fact that the mainstream parties copy the positions of the rightwing political parties will be taken for approbating the reasonability of those positions, it will instead lead the voters to vote for the original authors of the positions. In sum, the shock of this wave of right-wing populist forces has only subsided for the time being, they being far from subsidence for good from now on.

MAIN AREAS FOR ACTION OF THE EU AFTER BREXIT REFERENDUM

After the UK triggered off the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and launched the process of secession from the EU, the European Council held a special Brexit summit on April 29 at which the 27 EU member states were so extraordinarily united that in a matter of minutes they adopted the guidelines for the Brexit negotiations. At the same time, the 27 EU member states had to react to the cause of the Brexit referendum so as to avoid domino effect of the Brexit. In sharp contrast to their “unity” on Brexit negotiations, the 27 EU countries could only seek “minimal consensus” on future areas of action.

As early as June 29, 2016, the 27 EU member states held an informal meeting, at which they decided to start a political reflection. All EU member states stood for conducting reform against the ongoing crisis and addressing to the concerns and misgivings of EU citizens under the premise of not revising the EU treaties. In a statement published after the informal meeting, priority areas for action agreed by all countries include to provide EU (internal and external) security, jobs and growth, as well as hope for a better future, particularly in the interest of the young people.

The discussion on the future of the EU continued at the informal meeting at Bratislava on September 16, 2016. At the meeting, the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap was adopted, which placed priorities of action on immigration control, external border protection, providing internal security against terrorism, enhancing external security and defense, economic and social development and improvement on the opportunities for the young people. However, concrete measures embraced by the roadmap were very limited. At the EU informal summit held in Valletta, capital of Malta on February 3, 2017, discussions continued on the future of the EU and management of immigrant crisis. The EU (including the UK) displayed rare unanimity on the issue of immigrant control and adopted Malta Declaration that included a ten-priority plan, focusing on strengthening cooperation with Libya in stemming the refugee flow to Italy along the Central Mediterranean route. However, discussing the future of the EU, the 27 EU member states failed to produce systemic policies or plans in order to achieve unity within the EU.

From the start of the Bratislava process to the EU summit in Rome, the political reflection was put on hold for the time being. To review the process, the areas of action that the 27 EU member states could agree upon mainly concentrated on issues of external border control of the EU and counter terrorism. For instance, in October 2017, the EU established the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which immediately launched a rapid reaction border force in December. However, outstanding differences continue to exist within the EU. On refugee policy, there are differences between East European countries that stand for accepting refugees on voluntary basis and West European countries for taking in refugees according to quota. On economic policy, there are differences between South European countries that stand for fiscal expansion and North European countries for fiscal austerity.

Though the 27 EU member states have a relatively clear understanding of the problems residing in the EU, they can only achieve very limited consensus on concrete measures because of afore said differences. At present, the EU remains “tinkering at the edges”. Nonetheless, the political elite of the EU are mindful of the fact it cannot address the problems on the profound level of the union to “kick the can down the road”. Thus, they also attempt to give the answer to the fundamental question of the future direction for the development of the EU.

FEASIBILITY OF“MULTI-SPEED EUROPE”

According to the plan of the 27 EU member states, a conclusion would be drawn of the political reflection upon the future trend of the EU by March 25, 2017 when the EU marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. As the junction of time approached, President Juncker of European Commission presented the White Paper on the Future of Europe, pushing all countries further with the discussion centering on the question of direction. The white paper does not put forward a clear-cut plan for the future of the EU but rather provides five scenarios for discussion ranging from returning to a single market to carrying on with “small steps forward” to “multi-speed Europe”and on to pushing integration forward in all policy areas. Among the afore said scenarios, Germany and Franceunequivocally went for the scenario of“multi-speed Europe”. Relating to this, a problem cropped up that some of East European countries expressed misgivings about the scenario lest that West European countries striding ahead will marginalize countries like themselves, leaving them as second class member states. In order to remove the antagonism of those countries, the Rome Declaration published on March 25, though included the term of “multi-speed Europe”, put many qualifications before and after it. For instance, the declaration made special emphasis on that “only when necessary” could this action be taken, which would be carried out with the framework of EU treaties, open to the entry of all countries somewhere down the road.

However, such a “cosmetic change”cannot induce East European countries to support the “multi-speed Europe” scenario in return. In fact, the governments of Hungary and Poland believe that in the future the EU should return to the political union that is intergovernmental in nature. In another word, the EU should be “disintegrated” to have jurisdiction over those policy areas where it can provide efficient solutions only but to return jurisdiction to member states where it cannot.

Another, more fundamental question is that if “multi-speed Europe” can serve as a panacea for the EU to rid itself of current predicaments? Here, people cannot arrive at simple judgment. On the one hand, “multi-speed Europe” is nothing new but a set practice within the union. Be it the Euro zone or the Schengen zone, it is nothing but “coalition of the willing”. Furthermore, in other policy areas (for example in the area of EU patent law), there are precedents of some of the EU member states taking the lead by availing themselves of the mechanism of “enhanced cooperation”as stipulated in the EU treaties.

What makes the difference is that in the past “multi-speed Europe” was only taken for exception and necessary choice. Now it is taken for a way-out for the EU to be free from predicaments and is written into the Rome Declaration as such. Therefore, “multi-speed Europe” is given still more important significance.

At present, Germany and France have already chosen some of the areas that it is likely or imperative to advance European integration through the mechanism of “multi-speed Europe”, defense integration for instance. Since US President Trump took office who once alleged that the NATO was dated, the necessity and urgency for the EU to advance independent security and defense policy have increased.

However, on the other hand, as“multi-speed Europe” rids the European integration of obstruction by very few countries, it also leaves the EU, whose structure is already very complicated and not transparent, beyond the understanding of the general public of the EU and therefore even less able to achieve any goal close to the desire of its citizenry. In view of this, though the core EU countries like Germany and France can flaunt the flag of “multi-speed Europe”in the future for greater legitimacy to be the vanguard of European integration, they will be more prudent in practice to push for “multi-speed Europe”. For them, “multi-speed Europe” is, after all, but a means to get rid of the fetters or abduction by very few countries rather than in its own right the objective for European integration that they desire.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION STILL WRIGGLES ITS WAY FORWARD

The course of EU development attests to it that integration is rarely linear. To the contrary, it is more often than not equational and crisis-driven. Though this time around the EU has encountered a crisis hitherto unseen, which unprecedentedly gave rise to the “disintegrating” phenomenon like the Brexit, people still cannot ignore the fact that the EU move forward with small steps by “tinkering at the edges”, ever though it is doubtful if such tinkering can regain confidence in the EU. Therefore, the EU has not casted away its basic feature of wriggling its way forward, except this time around the vicissitude is larger than ever before.

By escaping the disaster of a rightwing populist party winning election in France and wielding its government power to disintegrate it, the EU has gained a breathing space. As Macron, a Europhile, has become French President, the hope is rekindled with the EU for reviving German-French Axis to advance integration. After all, Germany needs a strong France as its partner to jointly push European integration forward, either in the mode of “wriggling its way forward” collectively or in the mode of “multi-speed Europe”. However, any major move is not likely to happen until after German federal election on September 24, 2017.

In its Rome Declaration, the EU makes clear its development goals, being devoted to achieving a more secure Europe, an affluent and sustainable Europe and a Europe of social welfare that is still stronger in the world. The EU also points out the preconditions for realizing these goals, especially including listening to the voice of the general public and responding to their interest. If this can be achieved in the future, then the EU can to a large degree remove the soil that breeds populism, or at least be more resilient in dealing with the situation when Euroscepticism and anti-EU forces stir up trouble once more..

10.19422/j.cnki.cn10-1398/d.2017.03.010