YU SHAOHUA

Research Fellow, Institute of Asian-Pacif i c Studies, China Institutes for International Studies

SITUATION CONFUSING BUT WAYOUT CLEAR: CHANGES AND PROSPECT OF NORTHEAST ASIAN SITUATION

YU SHAOHUA

Research Fellow, Institute of Asian-Pacif i c Studies, China Institutes for International Studies

Recently, in Northeast Asian situation there have occurred escalation of tension and intensification of antagonism seldom seen before. At the same time, however, there are also explorations and signs of restarting dialogue and cooperation that have stagnated since long ago. Development trends of the situation are confusing to the eye, but reconciliation and cooperation remain the way-out for all parties to avert damage and get benef i t. There have been changes in government in the United States and the ROK respectively, and what opportunities this will bring to the major country contest in Northeast Asia and DPRK-ROK relations depends on the direction of interaction between countries in the region.

The Carl Vinson carrier strike group was gathered on the peninsula, March 14,2017.

ESCALATION OF THE KEY ISSUE AND ITS TURN FOR THE BETTER HAPPEN IN TANDEM

Over the past year and more, the regional situation has continued to be tense, the duration and severity of which surpass the past.

On the one hand, the DPRK conducted two nuclear tests and more than twenty missile tests throughout 2016. Since the outset of 2017, though the DPRK has not, as speculated by the international opinions, conducted its sixth nuclear test, it has conducted two successful missile tests, the Pukguksong 2 intermediate-range ballistic missile on February 12 and the Hwasong 12 longrange ballistic missile on May 14, the former being taken for the DPRK possessing the capability of striking on US military bases in Okinawa and Guam and the latter signifying its “capability of striking on the US homeland”. Sustaining the most severe UN sanctions in history, the words and deeds of the DPRK of “meeting hardline with super hardline” are also on the increase rather than the decrease.

On the other hand, the US, Japan and the ROK have continued to escalate related military deployment and contingent preparations in the name of dealing with the threat of DPRK nuclear missiles, leaving the powder keg of Northeast Asia nearer and nearer to its flash point. Since March 13, Foal Eagle-Key Resolve joint wargame of the US and the ROK has kicked off, both its scale and intensity making a historical high. Not only was the input of troop strength unprecedented, but also the Carl Vinson carrier strike group and a large number of advanced warplanes were gathered on the peninsula, and the THAAD anti-missile system also seized the opportunity to land in the ROK and participate in the wargame. The content of the wargame focused on “detecting, disrupting, destroying and defending DPRK nuclear missiles”, being highly threatening and dangerous. At the same time, President Trump remarked for the first time that the conciliatory North Korea policy of the Obama Administration was thoroughly bankrupt and in the future the US would have“all options” on the table to deal with the Korean nuclear crisis. Vice-President Pence and US Secretary of State Tillerson were in unison of refusing to rule out “the possibility of taking military action against the North Korean regime”.

Against this backdrop, the media warfare and psychological warfare between both sides to the antagonism have keptescalating, decibels soaring in alleging that the Korean nuclear issue cannot but be solved by the force of arms and that it is inevitable for war and chaos to happen in Northeast Asia. There were once true worries lest it became selffulfilling prophecy.

Fortunately, the voice for calm consideration and pragmatic judgment still exists. The principled stand of China on regional hotspot issues remains consistent and firm. Before the“April crisis”, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s proposal for “double moratorium” in dealing with the peninsula crisis, displaying China’s will to be anchor of stability for the situation. Afterward, at the Mar-a-Lago Estate Meeting, President Xi and President Trump sent the signal to the world that China and the US would cooperate in joint exploration to see “if the issue could be resolved through peaceful means”. Other signals for dialogue and contact have come out. On May 1, President Trump said in an interview that he would like to meet Kim Jong-un under right circumstances. Later on, US Secretary of State Tillerson pledged that the US would not seek regime change in North Korea, neither seeking to topple the government of North Korea nor accelerating reunification between the North and South Koreas nor seeking pretext to cross the 38th Parallel. The newly elected President Moon Jae-in of the ROK remarked in his inaugural address that he “would like to visit Pyongyang if conditions allow”, which was interpreted by the public opinions as an intent to move the inter-Korean relationship back to the track of dialogue. Between May 8 and 9, Ms. Choe Son Hui, Director-General of the North America Bureau of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and her delegation held a meeting in Oslo, the Norwegian capital with “non-governmental American citizens” whose names were not disclosed, first meeting of this kind between the two sides since President Trump took office.

SEARCHING FOR NEW DYNAMICS TO OBSTRUCTED COOPERATION

Besides the hotspot issues, the posture of cooperation between countries in the region is another window for observing the situation of Northeast Asia. In recent history, when the regional situation is relatively stable, cooperation between North and South Koreas, cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea and even China-US coordination are correspondingly smooth and fruitful. However, against the background of regional issues getting heated all at once, such as the issue of denuclearization of the peninsula, the historical issue between China, Japan and South Korea and issues of territorial disputes, various clusters of bilateral and multilateral cooperation will suffer setbacks and be obstructed, most typical of which are relations between North and South Koreas and China-Japan-South Korea cooperation.

North-South Korea relations have slid down since the Kŭmgangsan shooting incidence of 2014. By 2016, it would not be exaggeration to use the term “being left with no room for retreat” to describe it: comprehensive severing of economic cooperation between both sides, deterioration of political and diplomatic relations directly hitting the bottom line of one another and military antagonism and confrontation spear-heading each other’s government and its head, each vowing to launch preemptive strike against the other.

As for China-Japan-South Korea cooperation, after it became a meeting mechanism in its own right beyond the ASEAN+3 framework, it prospered once with remarkable progress. However, affected by multiple interferences of security and historical issues, such an effort has never made a breakthrough on the most fragile and shortest plank of the bucket. The differences between the positions of concerned parties have not been narrowed. Nay, they have enlarged and it is inevitable for the disputes and antagonism to hurt the trilateral coordination. Since 2012, the mechanism of leaders’ meeting has taken a direct hit. Although it was once restarted in 2015, the table has yet to be turned.

In this regard, one cannot help noting the bilateral cooperation between China and the ROK. Since July 2016 when the ROK decided for the deployment of the THAAD system, China-South Korea relationship has come into a precipitous decline. As a bilateral relationship most likely to bring about cooperation that transcends differences in social system and ideology and most likely to go between and balance all parties in the region, the setback of China-South Korea has even affected the overall posture of regional cooperation and left the pattern of regional cooperation more complex.

A turn for the better more often than not happens as both of the parties feel that the cost of antagonism outweighs what they have to pay for cooperation. In recent years, using the North Korean nuclear missile threat for pretext, Japan has continued to take precarious steps in setting itself free for military development and taking a voyage with a borrowed boat, which in fact ties the country closer to the war wagon of the US and takes it further and further away from its goal of becoming a major political power. The Trump Administration has rejected the TPP. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the construction of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank keep progressing. It has gradually become a foregone conclusion for Japan to turn to be an increasingly defensive party in China-Japan territorial dispute. All this has made Japan to rethink. Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party came to Beijing for the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation and presented to President Xi Jinpinga letter from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Though it cannot be taken for a substantial policy turnabout of Japan, it obviously tallies with China’s intent to manage bilateral differences and bring the relationship back to the track of cooperation. Therefore, it can be assumed that the search is on for an opportunity to turn around China-Japan relations.

Mr. Moon Jae-in was elected the 19th President of the ROK and has got into his role immediately. The diplomatic debut of his new government was to send a delegation to the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. During the meeting, President Xi Jinping made himself available for a meeting with Mr. Park Byeong-seug, leader of the ROK delegation. In spite of North Korea’s missile test then, Mr. Park Byeongseug had a meeting, all be it brief, with Mr. Kim Yong Jae, leader of the DPRK delegation. Both of the news items gave proof to the outside interpretation of the diplomatic priorities of the Moon Jae-in Government, namely to repair China-ROK relations that had been severely damaged during the Park Geun-hye Government and to break the ice for restoring contacts with the DPRK. Evidently, the ROK foreign policy has changed with the change of government, which may be good news for reactivating the obstructed regional cooperative relations. As there is a trend for China-Japan relations and China-South Korea relations to move for the better, one can expect a return of vitality to China-Japan-South Korea cooperation.

CHALLENGES ARISING FROM PROFOUND-LEVEL CONTRADICTIONS REMAIN SEVERE

Although the above positive developments have happened when the situation is most complicated and perilous, challenges arising from profoundlevel contradictions remain severe and should not be overlooked.

One of the greatest uncertainties of current Northeast Asian situation is the change of government in South Korea over the past decade between conservative and progressive parties. However, the prospect of the Moon Jae-in Government differs greatly still from that of the Kim Dae-jung or Roh Moo-hyun Governments, which at least leaves him facing resistance in the following areas. First, the US will clamp down on South Korean diplomacy increasingly. Reluctant to see trouble from a centrifugal ally at an important juncture in the regional situation, it will maintain pressure on South Korea on sanctions against North Korea, reconciliation with Japan and finalizing the deployment of THAAD system. Second, the perception of North Korea and Korean nuclear issue by the general public of South Korea has changed a great deal from the time of “Sunshine Policy”. Before any progress of the process of denuclearization of the peninsula, any tension that touches off concerns and discontent of the general public of South Korea may lead to North-South Korea relations being kidnapped by political correctness of the nuclear missile program of North Korea being the greatest threat to South Korea, becoming a new resistance to the probe for a new North Korea policy by the new government. Third, the forces of conservative parties in opposition still wield great political influence and popular support, seeming likely to achieve aggregation advantage in parliament and to constrain policy readjustment by the government of Democratic United Party away from that of the previous government. Fourth, the THAAD policy that jumped the gun of the Moon Jaein Government may become a big burden, leaving South Korea with a hard choice in dealing with its US policy and its China policy and limiting its overall initiative and flexibility in diplomacy.

Obviously, the readjustment of South Korean foreign policy toward relaxation as forecasted by some of the analysts, if implemented, will be a leveraging factor for the overall turning for the better in the Northeast Asian situation. However, it may be easier for the above resistances to interfere with the situation. Besides, it is worth noting that complications on a larger plane may happen if concerned countries lack correct assessment of the situation or prematurely expect and make use of it.

The strategic contest between major countries is bound to be accompanied by structural contradictions, particularly in Northeast Asia with concentration of interest of major countries and rapid change in rise and fall of their power. Judging by the track record of competition and cooperation in China-US relations as reflected on the issue of denuclearization in the peninsula, the bilateral cooperation has gradually moved from a bright spot to a front of contest over the years, which admittedly attributes not only to the deterioration of the situation on the North Korean nuclear issue but also to the clashes between the US and China as the former attempts to ensure its leading position in the region and the latter attempts to extend its influence on the regional security affairs. There are similar frictions of interest in another relationship, that between China and Japan. Against the above background, it will encounter piling resistances to resolve the hotspot issues of the region. On the one hand, considering different intents of various countries, it is difficult to restart the dialogue process and there are growing concerns lest the long-standing tension in the situation may increasingly get out of control. On the other, the cooperation of the US-Japan and US-South Korea military alliances tend to keep escalating under the pretext of North Korean nuclear threat, there being dynamics for developing and deepening trilateral security cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea. The shock of the THAAD system entering South Korea has resulted in Japan-South Korea agreement on protection of military intelligence after traumatizing mutual trust between China and South Korea. After the THAAD system availing itself of the opportunity of USSouth Korea joint wargame to land in South Korea, its intoxicating effects on relations between concerned countries continue to take toll. To follow the trend, calls for introducing the THAAD system to Japan and even for the country to possess nuclear weapons add fuel to the fire now and then. If such a posture of disrupting regional strategic balance, intensifying regional tensions and directly hurting China’s security inter-est is not contained, it will be difficult to build mutual trust between China and the US and between China and Japan, and their effects to the regional situation will be negative.

THE WAY-OUT IS CLEAR AND NEEDS SYNERGY OF ALL PARTIES

The Northeast Asian situation is at an unprecedented, complicated juncture. Various tendencies take place in tandem but mostly are uncertain. Centering on North Korean nuclear missile program, calls for military solution and preparations for military operation exceed their historical intensity. The latest comments of Japan and South Korea on the subject seem to indicate that according to research and assessment, military solution is not the necessary option as its success cannot be counted on. President Trump is successful in creating an energy field of not carrying on “strategic patience”but rather exerting “maximum pressure” and ultimately finding solution to the issue singlehandedly. Meanwhile, he has made, for the first time, clear “4 No’s” commitment on the North Korean issue. Comparing to the Obama period, China and the US send more signals for increased consensus and deepening cooperation rather than picking other people’s faults and seeking the other side’s responsibility in their commenting on the issue of denuclearization in the peninsula. As the conflict of interest between them on a profound level goes on, the limits to China-US cooperation and the bottom line of their differences remain in suspension. In spite of it, as China-US cooperation has been amplified unprecedentedly and touched off delicate reactions from Japan and Russia out of their respective positions. The worries and speculation of returning to Cold War confrontation with China, Russia and North Korea on one side and the US, Japan and South Korea on the other prompted by the THAAD shock are not supported by the following signs: China-North Korea relations are increasingly strained amid frequent coordination between China and the US and increasing mutual bad-mouthing in the media between China and North Korea; in contrast, Russia-North Korea relations keep getting close, which is interpreted as moving against China and the US; the enhanced US-South Korea alliance needs to be put on display by a solid landing of the THAAD system, but instead the quarrel between both countries on cost-sharing has been surprising; availing themselves of the THAAD situation, Japan and South Korea have enhanced their ties, which may be reversed by a new round of disputes on the issue of comfort women.

Although development trends of the regional situation are confusing and clashing with one another, the way-out for a solution to the regional issues is not uncertain: the ongoing contradictions and regional issues should be resolved through consultation and negotiation; all actions for one’s own absolute security that add to tension and antagonism should give way to parallel cooperation for common security. As practice over time has attested to the fact that antagonism cannot fundamentally resolve issues, that stalemate and deterrence do not help change the other side and that it is hardly possible to produce a permanent cure only by placing pressure and sanctions. Second, the outcome of antagonism benefits no one, and especially when strings of antagonism have been pulled too tight for too long, and once war or chaos happens, none of the parties will be a winner. Just as it is true for regional hotspot issues like the Korean nuclear issue, so is it also for other bilateral issues pending solution. Furthermore, judging by actual conditions in the past few years, many of the issues, the denuclearization of the peninsula included, have failed to be solved properly not because of that all means of consultation are exhausted and proven futile but because of that the way to consultation is blocked by the obsession of power or “super hardline”. For instance, on denuclearizing the peninsula, China has propose the thinking for negotiation of “parallel progress of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and switch from the mechanism of armistice to that of peace treaty” and, to go with it, the proposal for “double moratorium”, which have not received positive response from a majority of the countries to the sixparty talks. It also illustrates that it is the lack of dialogue and consultation that is a major attribute to the fact that the efforts over the years to promote denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have failed to work effectively.

It is beyond doubt that the key to a clear way-out lies in synergy of all parties. Although the afore said conflict of strategic interest of all parties is structural, it remains possible to guarantee the most fundamental interest of all parties with minimal cost by means of consultation. Not giving up zerosum thinking of absolute security and absolute dominance can only take one further and further away from the objective. Under current circumstances, there are three objectives in Northeast Asia worth achieving by synergy of all concerned parties at the cost of certain compromise. The first one is to restart the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Within the framework of six-party talks, it will begin with “double moratorium”, followed by the joint establishment of pragmatic goal, the principles of synchronization and phasing to go by, and the search for a solution that addresses both the symptoms and root cause. A second is to restart China-Japan-South Korea cooperation. The significance of a constructive relationship and cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea to peace and stability of Northeast Asia is self-evident. To seize the opportunity that is arising will help reduce not only tension in the regional situation but also pressure on domestic and foreign policies of the three countries. Finally, it is necessary for China and the US to properly handle their differences on regional hotspot issues for their responsibility as major countries to the region. Above all, it is necessary to make a change on current state of affairs of the North Korean issue where the hand of exerting pressure and sanction is too hard whereas that of conducting dialogue and consultation is too soft, a key to which in particular rests with the change in US posture and exertion of influence.

10.19422/j.cnki.cn10-1398/d.2017.03.008