周柳

摘要：运用演化博弈理论，建立了一个农产品供应商和生产加工商的两级供应链的信息共享动态演化博弈模型，并对系统长期的动态演化过程进行分析。结果表明，农产品供应链上各企业进行信息共享的行为与博弈双方的支付矩阵及初始值有关。博弈双方的信息吸收能力、共享量和协同效应系数越大，信息共享概率越大；信息共享成本和风险越大，信息共享概率越小；初始值的增大有利于信息共享，但到一定程度后，各企业会逐渐趋于信息不共享。

关键词：演化博弈；农产品供应链；信息共享；演化稳定策略

中图分类号：F274；C934 文献标识码：A 文章编号：0439-8114（2017）09-1751-04

DOI：10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2017.09.038

Agricultural Supply Chain Information Sharing Behavior Research

Based on the Evolutionary Game

ZHOU Liu

（Business School of Hohai University， Nanjing 211100，China）

Abstract： A two-stage game model of agricultural supplier and manufacturer supply chain information sharing was established using evolutionary game theory， and long-term dynamic evolution process of the system was analyzed. Results showed that the information sharing behavior of enterprises in the agricultural supply chain was related to the payment matrix and the initial value of the game. The coefficient of the information absorption capacity，the sharing capacity and the co-effect were greater， the probability of information sharing was greater. The cost and the risk were greater， the probability of information sharing was the smaller. The increase of initial value was conducive， but when it come to a certain extent， enterprises would gradually tend to not sharing.

Key words： evolutionary game；agricultural supply chain；information sharing；evolutionary stable strategy

农业是中国国民经济的基础产业，农业持续、健康、稳步的发展直接关系到国富民强和社会稳定[1]。在农产品市场中，技术革新使竞争跳出企业，上升至供应链水平。在农产品供应链的源头，以农户、农场等为主的农产品供应商为市场提供了丰富的资源供给；在以需求决定供给的交易市场中，传统的流通和销售方式却难以与高速发展的农业产出相配套应用。这种供应链上下游发展的不匹配给农产品市场，尤其是供应商带来了一系列的负面影响，甚至出现“菜贱伤农”、“谷贱伤农”现象。究其原因，主要在于整个供应链中，各参与方获取的信息参差不齐。特别是农产品供应商由于信息较为闭塞，只能选择固定的收购和加工商，供应链的多次分销，使其遭受层层盘剥。在转型经济环境下，供应链上各企业的利益是相对独立的，容易产生信息的延误，从而影响整个供应链的运行效率[2]。……