Lu Guangsheng



How Can LMC Gain Prominence among Mechanisms in the Mekong River Region？

Lu Guangsheng

Multilateral mechanisms have successively come into being in the Mekong River region in recent years， as cooperation among countries inside and outside the region have increasingly warmed up. China also established the Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Mechanism （hereinafter referred to as LMC） with countries along the Mekong River in March 2016. To show its importance， LMC， which is now confronted with the volatile and complicated mechanisms in this region，needs to have a right orientation， ensure its development direction and build mutual interests with relevant countries with an open and flexible attitude.

The First LMC Leaders' Meeting was held in Hainan， China on March 24， 2016. As the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said， the first meeting played a significant role of “setting up regulations and fixing the pitch” in the LMC's future development. Officially launched on November 12， 2015， LMC involves six member states—China， Cambodia， Laos，Myanmar， Thailand and Vietnam. In fact， quite a few multilateral cooperation mechanisms have already been formed in the sub-Mekong River region before LMC. Hence， this situation has given rise to a series of questions： what similarities and differences are there among these multilateral mechanisms？Whether or not there is a competitive relationship among them？ How can LMC gain prominence among numerous multilateral mechanisms and further serve the Belt and Road Initiative and China's diplomatic strategies towardneighboring countries？ These questions will be discussed below.

Booming Multilateral Mechanisms in the Mekong River Region

Multilateral mechanisms have kept springing up in the Mekong River region during recent years. Besides the lately-launched LMC by China， nations such as the United States， Japan， South Korea and India have also established multilateral mechanisms with countries along the Mekong River in different forms respectively， forming certain actual competition among each other. In this sense， LMC shall even be taken as a latecomer.

Cooperation between the United States and the Mekong River region. The US Obama administration， since coming into power in 2009，has made significant adjustments to its global strategy， and firmly carried out “return to Asia-Pacific” and “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategies with the Mekong River region as a strategic stronghold. The Lower Mekong Initiative （LMI） was proposed in the First US-Lower Mekong Foreign Ministers' Meeting jointly held by the United States， Thailand， Cambodia， Vietnam，and Laos in July 2009， to advance cooperation in such fields as environment，health， education and infrastructure construction. Moreover， the United States took the initiative to conduct “Friends of the Lower Mekong” （FLM）in the framework of existing LMI， to reinforce development and assistance in the Mekong River region by involving such countries as New Zealand， Japan as well as international organizations as Asian Development Bank （ADB） and World Bank. Myanmar joined LMI later in 2012 and most recently worked with the United States to hold the enlarged meeting of FLM in Pakse， Laos in April 2015 and to approve the revised “LMI Project” （2016-2020） in August on the Eighth LMI Ministers' Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur with the aim to enhance cooperation in sectors of agriculture， food and energy security， interconnection， education， environment， water and health etc.

Cooperation between Japan and the Mekong River region. The first Japan-Mekong Summit was held to build a “new type of partnership for a mutually prosperous future” jointly by Japan， Cambodia， Laos， Myanmar，Thailand and Vietnam in October 2009. Thereafter， the very summit has been a formed mechanism held annually. Under the framework， Japan set up a bilateral assistance mechanism exclusively towards Cambodia， Laos and Vietnam，according to which Japan would give supports to their trade， investment and industrial development. Since reelected as the Japanese prime minister in December 2012， Shinzo Abe has laid great emphasis on “value-oriented diplomacy” to develop cooperation with countries sharing the same values， and also to change those with different values by offering them economic aids. Abe indicated on the seventh Japan-Mekong Summit in July 2015 that Japan would in three years provide 750 billion yen （37.4 billion yuan） to countries along the Mekong River as the official development assistance （ODA）.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang （third from right） poses with leaders from five ASEAN countries at a welcoming ceremony of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders' Meeting， in Sanya， March 22， 2016.

Cooperation between India and the Mekong River region. Since the Mekong River region serves as the first stop in India's “looking east” policy，India has unfolded cooperation with these countries proactively， so as to open the continental channel into Southeast Asia. The Mekong-GrangesCooperation Initiative （MGCI）， with priorities on tourism， education （human resource development）， culture and transportation， was launched together by India and countries along the Mekong River in October 2000，as an important measure to fuel the diplomatic policy， to construct highways and railways connecting adjacent countries. Later in 2010， the project of Mekong-India Economic Corridor was initiated together by Japan and other four nations （ Vietnam， Cambodia， Thailand and Myanmar）， proposing to build one trade route linking India and the Mekong River region with focus on infrastructure construction.

Cooperation between South Korea and the Mekong River region. South Korea has caught up recently by implementing development strategies in the Mekong River region. The First South Korea-Mekong Ministers' Meeting was unveiled in Seoul in October 2011 by South Korea and five states in the Mekong River's lower reach. The meeting approved a declaration aimed at building South Korea-Mekong comprehensive partnership for mutual prosperity， and defined bilateral tenets， principles， prior fields and mechanisms etc. The cooperation touches upon the fields of infrastructure，information technology， environmental protection， water conservation，agriculture and rural development and human resource development and so on. Meanwhile， the meeting also confirmed foreign ministers' meeting and senior officials' summit as their cooperation mechanisms.

Besides above-mentioned mechanisms， there still exist many other multilateral mechanisms in the Mekong River region， two famous among which are the Great Mekong Sub-region Cooperation （GMS） and Mekong River Commission （MRC）. Established in 1992 on the initiative of ADB，GMS attaches more importance to the cooperation on transportation，energy， telecommunication， environment， tourism， human resource development， trade and investment， etc. While MRC enjoys a longer history，which can be traced back to the Lower Mekong Investigation Commission （namely the old MRC） set up in 1957. The new MRC was established in April 1995 with Cambodia， Laos， Thailand and Vietnam signing a cooperative agreement on sustainable development of the Mekong RiverBasin to tackle cooperatively such issues as comprehensive development and management of the region's water and other resources. As yet China and Myanmar are still not the members of MRC for various reasons.

It can be drawn up that mechanisms in the Mekong River region came forward in great numbers， a phenomenon called by some scholars as “mechanism congestion，” and this is definitely not cost-effective. Then why these mechanisms still exist even so？ As the old saying goes like this “what is actual is rational，” countries concerned take the other side of the picture，deeming that “one more is not so bad” to say the least， and even “maybe we can get some benefits.” All these are exactly the reason for the existence of so many mechanisms in the Mekong River region.

Similarities and Differences among Mechanisms in the Mekong River Region

Similarities of Mechanisms in the Mekong River Region

First， they are all sub-regional cooperative mechanisms with the common partner—the Mekong River region. To be more specific， they are “cooperation circles” centering about lower Mekong countries （excluding China）. If put in concepts related to international economic integration and regionalism， the countries in the Mekong River's lower reach are “hubs”while others are “spokes.”

Second， lower Mekong countries， as the common center， are relatively passive in advancing these multilateral cooperative mechanisms， or in other words， they are not the “driving force，” which is somewhat interesting. It can be seen that from cooperative initiatives universally advocated by most nations outside the region， nations outside offer the driving force and content of cooperation and financial support， while lower Mekong countries are responsible for “coordinating and following.”

What the two similarities reflect is the chasm commonly existed in these mechanisms—the chasm between geographical and driving force centers. The “chasm” can be interpreted in three aspects. （1） Lower Mekong countriesdo not have strong will and power to push forward these mechanisms， that it to say it is not them yet countries outside the region that are more likely to “ask favors.” （2） Countries outside the region， out of their own intentions，take every single strength to cooperate with lower Mekong states， mainly to expand their regional influence there. （3）Whether one mechanism is rewarding or not depends on whether it can fill up the chasm.

Third， these mechanisms all feature looseness and flexibility， with interconnectivity and openness among them to some extent. In line with the integration within the region and ASEAN and East Asia at large， mechanisms in the Mekong River region also maintain the basic principles of “sovereignty supremacy and consensus.” In simple terms， “Everything is negotiable” is the rule， thus failed negotiation can be renewed next time， and there exists no so-called principle of “the subordination of the minority to the majority，”or the pressure of members from the expectation to reach agreement in the end. This bears much resemblance with the “ASEAN way” in distinct “soft institutions.” Theoretically， these mechanisms， with soft institutions， should be open and even somehow connected to each other on issues and agenda rather than closed up. It is understandable that the above feature does not show itself obviously in different forms of mechanisms， since they basically maintain their own operation modes for the absence of the need to “merge into oneness” under general conditions. But possibilities shall not be excluded that certain powers attempt to propel some of them for certain ends under special circumstance， which brings competition and even rejection to other mechanisms. Seen from the historic development from “10+3”（ASEAN plus China， Japan and Korea） to “10+6” （additionally plus India，Australia and New Zealand） and further into“10+8” （adding the United States and Russia to the list）， there lies the intention of opposing China to some extent， be it Japanese diplomatic policy of the “arc of Asian democracy and vitality，” or the “advancement of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement”（TPP） by Washington. Hence， we shall look out for the de ja vu happened again in the Mekong River region.

Differences among Mechanisms in the Mekong River Region

The first difference lies in their different foundations. LMC bases itself on Great Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation （GMS）， which boasts achieved fruits in mechanism construction and cooperation over a history of twentyodd years. Compared with LMC， mechanisms built with Japan， the United States， South Korea and India basically dive in echelons in cooperative foundation and level of institutionalization. Though reasons may be obscure and complicated， it has much to do with factors as geographical adjacency，common issues （and common demands and interests arising thereafter）， and attention and force from governments. China boasts irreplaceable merits in above aspects with advantageous location of bordering on the Mekong River region （India and Myanmar do the same， yet don't matter much in this case）.

The second difference is the priority of cooperation fields. China's LMC carries an overall framework of “three-in-one” integrating political security，economy and social culture， and its recent prior agenda are interconnection，capacity cooperation， cross-border economy， water resources， agriculture，and poverty reduction. Japan attaches more importance to the official assistance and “value-oriented diplomacy.” The United States puts forward the functional cooperation （environment， climate， health， education and crackdown on drugs and smuggling etc.） under the policies of “democratic reform” and “return to Asia-Pacific.” South Korea pays more attention to infrastructure， information technology， green growth， development of water resources， agriculture and rural areas as well as cultivation of talents. And India gives priority to free trade agreement and tourism etc.

The third difference lies in the focus of efforts. Difference can be identified mainly in the will or determination and possible investments of countries outside the region to step up cooperation. China will obtain fastest speed with the largest efforts put into， since it stands at highest outlook for LMC （ “community with a shared destiny”）. Japan inputs almost the same strength， which can be told from the consecutively huge funds it has invested in this region. As for the United States， “the action does not speak for their thought，” and it does not contribute much， at least not as much as itdeclares. South Korea establishes the framework first， but as for the detailed cooperation， it's still a big question. And India is still lingering on the phase of talking， rare practical actions can be found.

Competition of Multilateral Mechanisms in the Mekong River Region： How to Gain Prominence？

If China wants to gain prominence among these mechanisms， the following five aspects should be tackled.

First， China should give a proper position to LMC. To be specific， what is the role of LMC among China's global and regional strategic policies？ And what does it mean to the sought-after “Belt and Road” initiative and Sino-ASEAN partnership？ Up to now， institutions related have not given a clear orientation and explanation， which directly results in people's conjectures，suspicion and concerns. So this paper regards LMC as the updated version of GMS， and an important part of Sino-ASEAN cooperation， which does not only consider scruples from all sides， but also caters to the implementation of the “Belt and Road” initiative in this region to strategically build a community with a shared destiny.

Second， China should keep an open and flexible attitude. As mentioned above， LMC originates from GMS， thus there lies a natural developing link between them， rather than rivalry relations as “starting all over again” and “wane or wax.” Thus， the mechanism， channel， cooperation agenda， project arrangement and research basis used in GMS shall also be jointed to LMC and updated then. If not addressed properly， the coexistence of LMC and GMS will inevitably lead to chaotic situations in mechanisms， costs， and project operation. Take a simple example， LMC holds leaders' summit every two years， while for GMS the frequency is every three years. It means that GMS leaders' summit projected in 2017 and soon GMS counterpart in 2018， also the two leaders' summits coincided in 2020. Is this really necessary？ How about the effect？ So it's a must for all sides to study and solve this kind of problem flexibly with open hearts and to facilitate the joint and update.

Third， China should tap its unique strong points to build the basis of common interests. For one， China should make the best use of new resources and channels like the “Belt and Road” initiative， AIIB， the Silk Road foundation to outshine its capacity and leadership. For another，China should also take advantage of its unique geographic location of neighboring the lower Mekong countries， as well as of attractiveness from its funds， technology， and capacity and absorbtivity of market consumption ability， and of the urgency of non-traditional security issues （such as water resources， public hygiene， anti-terrorism and crackdown on drugs and smuggling）. It shall establish the network of common interests with lower Mekong countries so as to build the Lancang-Mekong community with a shared destiny. For example， during the economic cooperation with Mekong River countries， China shall focus more on “bringing in” while “steps out.”For example， many Mekong countries （especially Myanmar and Laos）have demanded China to loosen the barrier restrictions of tariff， quota and technology when exporting grain products such as rice and corn to China. As to this question， China can take market capability and purchasing power into full play and ease China-bound restrictions towards neighboring nations and deepen the mutual dependence on economy， to lay a vital foundation for a community with shared destiny.

Fourth， China should make different policies for different key tasks. Currently， due to the South China Sea dispute， Vietnam hesitates to expand cooperation with China. As for Myanmar， it is caught in the crossfire of unsolved internal matters after the newly-elected government on the one hand and raised price out of China's diplomatic policy towards Myanmar and Indian Ocean on the other hand. All these lead to innumerable difficulties and large uncertainties in China's neighboring strategic layout in Southeast Asia with Vietnam in the east and Myanmar in the west. Against this background， China， in the spirit of multilateral mechanisms， may as well adopt the strategy of “Multi-platforms， N-X action” and cooperate with certain member states in some mature fields and projects at first， rather than wait till the consensus reached among all members. For one thing， thiscan avoid the dilemma of cooperation with absolute consensus of all. For another， it will soften certain sensitivity with many similar cases in history. Specifically， China shares a favorable political basis and strategic demand with Laos， Thailand and Cambodia， which are situated in the middle part of the Mekong River region. Thus， it's a wise choice for China to follow the strategy of “down-the-middle thrust， moved wings，” so as to fuel the participation of Myanmar and Vietnam eventually. Recently， it is encouraged that China gives the supreme priority to Laos， including assisting Laos preparing for 2016 ASEAN rotating presidency. On the basis of respect and adequate exchange with Laos， China can increase its investment and assistance， and advance the negotiating and signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation between China and Laos. By this， China can increasingly enhance its magnet for other sub-Mekong countries.

Fifth， China should achieve some early fruits and bring their demonstration effect on later cooperation. At the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders' Meeting， Premier Li Keqiang has put forward a series of suggestions and commitment package to further cooperation. Among them are the project of “double ten” （10 billion yuan of favorable loans and 10 billion dollars of credit line）， aiming to cover $200 million of South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund to set up Lancang-Mekong Special Fund for the Mekong River region， to provide $300 million to support small and medium-sized cooperation projects within five years， and to offer real aid with Government Scholarship for 18 thousand people and 5，000 places for training in China within three years. At present， China should take joint efforts with other countries so that projects with potential “early fruits” in fields of interconnection， capacity cooperation， cross-border economy， water resource， agriculture and poverty reduction can be determined. Accordingly demonstrative and driving effect can be yielded with solid cooperation and real benefits， and eventually make sure that LMC gains its prominence among other Mekong region multilateral mechanisms.

Lu Guangsheng is Professor and Vice President of the Institute of International Studies， Yunan University. This article was translated from Chinese edition of Contemporary World， Issue 5， 2016.