宋倩倩

Abstract： Metonymy is not just a figure of speech， but a cognitive phenomenon. This paper presents a typology of metonymy and its cognitive motivation in terms of Lakoffs theory of idealized cognitive model （ICM）. On the basis of contiguous relationships， metonymy can take place in two general configurations： the whole ICM and its parts， parts and parts in the same ICM. At the same time， two general types of cognitive motivation in using metonymy are considered： human experience and perceptive salience.

Key words： metonymy； ICM； cognitive motivation； human experience； perceptive salience

1.Introduction

Metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon， whose role in the organization of meaning， utterance production and interpretation， and even grammatical structure is considerable. It is traditionally viewed as a figure of speech that involves a process of substituting one linguistic expression for another. This view is reflected in standard definitions， which tend to describe metonymy as “a figure of speech that consists in using the name of one thing for that of something else with which it is associated.” So far， cognitive linguistics has witnessed an overwhelming interest in the role of metaphor as a conceptual mechanism structuring large parts of our knowledge. Although the notion of metonymy was never entirely absent， it was mostly relegated to the minor status of being introduced or mentioned in an essentially metaphorical context. Nowadays， metonymy is claimed to be not just a matter of names of things， but essential a conceptual phenomenon which is distinguished by contiguity. More over， cognitive linguists such as Lakoff （1987）， Croft （1993）， Blank （1999）， Panther & Radden （1999）， Koch （1999） describe the network of contiguity from various perspectives. Based on these views the present paper intends to give a brief description of a typology of metonymy and its cognitive motivation.

2.The Contiguity of Metonymy

Various scholars have claimed that metonymy is as pervasive a phenomenon in language and thought as metaphor. A widely accepted definition of metonymy inspired by Langacker （1993） is the proposed by Radden & Kǒvecses （1999： 21）： ‘‘Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity， the vehicle， provides mental access to another conceptual entity， the target， within the same cognitive model. The notion of “contiguity” is the key term in the understanding and definition of metonymy， to which both traditional rhetorician and cognitive linguists agree. However， traditional approaches locate contiguity relationships in the world of reality， whereas cognitive approaches locate them at the conceptual level.

Jakobson （cf. Koch， 1999） believes that metonymy seems to presuppose a semantic contiguity between linguistic signs. Lakoff （1987） accounts for metonymic contiguity within the framework of idealized cognitive models. According to him， ICM is a complex structured whole， a gestalt， which uses four kinds of structuring principles： propositional structures， image-schematic structure， metaphoric mappings and metonymic mappings. The ICM concept is meant to include not only peoples encyclopedic knowledge of a particular domain but also the cultural models they are part of. ICMs are considered products of human conceptualizing capacities； they are composed of complex concepts and general categories， and correspond to the conceptual structures available to humans for making sense of their experience. Metonymic connectors are taken to operate among elements belonging to a single ICM. ICM plays a central role in the generation and understanding of metonymy. Generally speaking， a whole ICM is conceptually distinct from its parts， thus metonymy may arise easily from whole to part or part to whole. To a certain extent， distinction between the whole and part is the key to the generation of metonymy. Because our knowledge is organized by structured ICMs， we subsume the types of metonymy-generating relationships under two general conceptual configurations： whole ICM and its part（s） and parts of an ICM.

In ICM， contiguity doesnt exist in inner linguistic structures but exists among concepts. Based on these two kinds of contiguity， there are metonymies in which we access a part of an ICM via its whole or a whole ICM via one of its parts as well as metonymies in which we access a part via another part of an ICM. We will further explain it respectively in the fourth part.

3.Traditional Rhetorical Classification of Metonymy

According to the classical definition， metonymy is “ a figure in which one word is substituted for another on the basis of some material， causal， or conceptual relation” （ Preminger & Brogan，1993）. Traditional rhetorical classification attempted to induce every metonymic expression. Ungerer & Schmid listed the following nine types of substitution： part for whole： all hands at desk； whole for part： fill up the car； container for the contained： Ill have a glass； material for entities： a glass， an iron； producer for product： buy a Ford； location for institute： talk between Beijing and Washing ton； location for event： Watergate changed our politics； the controlled for controller： The buses are on strikes； reason for result： His native tongue is German. （1996， 116） This classification captures a range of phenomena which continue to be productive and widespread in variety of languages， hence traditional statements about metonymy have some classificatory value but there is little capacity for precision --- let alone for prediction. Furthermore no systematic rationale is offered for the metonymic associations listed in the rhetoric books.

Based on his trichotomy of contiguity， Ulinann （1962） classified metonymy into three types， of which A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS， AN ACTIVITY AND RELATED PHENOMENA， and KINSHIP RELATIONS are not based on his contiguity typology. Ulinann has also noticed this problem and listed these exceptions. As the research develops in depth with large extension， the feasibility of Ulinanns classification of metonymy is questionable.

4.Cognitive Linguistic Classification of Metonymy

Trying to develop taxonomies of metonymies arouses great interests in cognitive linguistics. Warrant （1999） differentiate five contiguities， composition， causation， possession， location and representation with a number of subcategories. The only one exception is aspect-attribute which is differentiated from metonymy. Warrant maintained that aspect-attribute belongs to implication， rather than metonymy. Based on frame and scenario theories， Blank （1999） generalized metonymic contiguity into two types， co-presence and succession. According to Bland， they correspond to two basic models of human conceptualization， synchronic and diachronic models， so he grouped all the possible metonymies into co-presence and succession. In Radden & K?vecses （1999） K?vecses （2002）， a thorough analysis of metonymy is given based on ICM. They hold that besides referential function， metonymy is in nature a conceptual phenomenon and a cognitive processing progress. Metonymy is a conceptual tool that operates within “idealized cognitive models” or “domain matrices”. In this view metonymy is defined as （Radden & K?vecses， 1999）：

A cognitive process in which one conceptual entity， the vehicle， provides mental access to another conceptual entity， the target， within the same idealized cognitive model.

Based on Lakoff （1987）， they make a further explanation on ICM， and hold that the notion of cognitive model is taken in its broadest sense， encompassing three ontological realms： concepts， forms （especially linguistic）， and things and events in the “real world”. Over these realms five potential metonymic relations are defined： （1） the sign relation between form and concept （e.g.， the relation between the form house and the concept house）， which shows the nature of language. They maintain that human languages as well as other communication systems are in essence metonymic. The reason for his is that human beings have no other choices but depend on language forms to communicate our concept. Thanks for the metonymic thinking model we are able to create languages to express knowledge in our mind. （2） three ‘‘referential relations （Form-Thing/Event， Concept-Thing/Event， and the relation between Concept-Form and Thing/Event） （e.g.， the relation between the form house or the concept house and the actual referent， i.e.， a concrete house or the set of houses）， and （3） the relation between one sign （Concept-Form） and another sign （Concept-Form）， which they call ‘‘concept metonymy（i） FORM a-CONCEPT a FOR FROM b-CONCEPT b （e.g.， bus–bus standing for bus driver– ‘bus driver）. （ii） FORM-CONCEPT a FORCONCETP b： mother--‘ motherfor ‘housewife-mother； （iii） FORM a-CONCEPT a FOR FORM a-CONCEPT b： White House- ‘place for White house- ‘institution； （iv）FORM a-CONCEPT a FOR FORM b-CONCEPT a： UN for United Nations.

These metonymies and their instantiates further demonstrate that firstly， these metonymic expressions are common conventional expressions in daily life， and we can hardly aware of them； secondly， usually more salient and accessible linguistic forms or concepts serve as the access to which less salient and accessible concepts can be understood. Then we will talk about metonymic specialization， i.e. specific typology and motivation of metonymy. According to ICM theory， metonymic specialization is subsumed under two general conceptual configurations： （a） Whole ICM and its part（s）； （b） Parts of an ICM. Configuration （a） may lead to metonymies in which we access a part of an ICM via its whole or a whole ICM via one of its parts； configuration （b） may lead to metonymies in which we access a part via another part of an ICM. We will deal with them respectively while analyze metonymic motivations from two aspects， human experience and perceptive salience.

4.1 Whole ICM and its Part（s）

The relation ship between a whole and a part typically applies to things and their parts. Here ‘thing should be treated in the schematic sense. Things， in particular physical objectives， are typically conceived of as forming a gestalt with well-delineated boundaries and as internally composed of various parts. ‘Whole-part configurations are assumed to account for the Thing-and-part ICM， the Scale ICM， the Constitution ICM， the Event ICM， the Category-and-property ICM， and the Reduction ICM.

4.1.1 Thing-and-Part ICM

This ICM may lead to the two metonymic variants： （a）WHOLE THING FOR A PART OF THE THING： America for‘the Unlted States of America； （b） PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING： England for‘the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

America is a whole continent，but we often use it to refer to the one of its geographical Parts，the United States of America. Conversely，we often speak of England but mean Great Britain. The WHOLE FOR PART metonymy is so productive that we find this kind of metonymy frequently in our daily communication. Langacker （1993：31） describes this linguistic phenomenon as “active-zone/ profile discrepancies”. An entitys active zone is defined as comprising “those potions of the entity that participate most directly and crucially in that relationship.” For example， in The dog bit me or The window was broken，the profiled whole things the dog and the window may be said to stand metonymically for the active-zone parts ‘the dogs teeth，and ‘the glasses of the window. Even clearly separate things may be conceptualized as active-zone parts of an over-arching whole ICM. Thus， we can accept ‘Turn down the milk as naturally a metonymic expression of ‘Turn down the gas under the pan which contains the milk， and ‘lighting the Christmas tree as a metonymic expression of ‘lighting the candles on the Christmas tree.

4.1.2the Scale ICM

Scales are a special class of things and the scalar units are parts of them. Typically， a scale as a whole is used to stand for its positive end and the positive end of a scale is used to stand for the scale as a whole. Physical measurement adjectives denoting the greater amount of the quality involved， such as big， are ‘semantically unmarked- they can be used to denote the quality common to the pair. The preference for one member of the pair is conditioned by perceptual salience （cf. Givón，1978； Cruse，1986）； the most salient member of the pair affords better mental access to the conceptual domain than the less salient one. This situation is metonymic， i.e. （a） WHOLE SCALE FOR POSITIVE END OF THE SCALE； （b） POSITIVE END OF A SCALE STANDS FOR THE WHOLE SCALE.

Look at the example： （1） He is speeding again. （2） How old are you. The word ‘speed actually means the whole scale of velocity but here it stands for the positive end of the scale，meaning ‘running to fast. The expression‘old refers to the positive end of the whole scale， but they stand for the whole scales. People are motivated to use the positive end to stand for the whole scale as well as the whole to stand for the positive end. When they use negative end of scale to express， their utterances must have a certain special implied conversational meaning. In other words， people are motivated to use negative end to achieve some special pragmatic effects. For instance： How young are you？

4.1.3Constitution ICM

This ICM involves matter， material or substances which are seen as constituting a thing. This ICM may lead to： （a） OBJECT FOR MATERIAL CONSTITUTING THE OBJECT： e.g. I smell skunk； （b） MATERIAL CONSTITUTING AN OBJECT FOR THE OBJECT： wood for‘forest.

Such ‘substance-things do not have parts but are constituted by their very substance. Substances are， among other things， characterized as being unbounded and uncountable. A substance or material may be metonymically conceived of as an object and is then construed as bounded and taken as a count noun as‘skunk. Conversely，an object may be conceived of as substance-like and is then construed as unbounded and coded as a mass noun as in ‘wood.

4.1.4Event ICM

Metaphorically speaking，every event is composed of a series of subevents. There exists metonymic relationship between event and its subevent（s）. Event ICM leads to two kinds of metonymies： （a） WHOLE EVENT FOR SUBEVENT： Bill smoked marijuana； （b） SUBEVENT FOR WHOLE EVENT： John speaks Chinese. The inhaling part of the event ‘smoke is probably the central and most important subevent and the one that is metonymically meant here. In example （b）， the subevent ‘speak is metonymically used to stand for the whole event ‘know the language which also includes the skills of listening， reading， etc.

The fact that people tend to use the subevent ‘speaking to stand for the whole habitual event indicates that many subevents serve as conventionalized expressions for an habitual event.

Metonymies also operate in the Auxiliary system. Take （b） as an example， as we know habitual events occur in past， present and future time， but are described by use of the Present Tense. If we assume that the Present Tense ideally located events in present time， its use for habitual events is metonymic. Another time metonymy is found in the use of the Present Tense for future events as in I am off for ‘I will be off. As for the metonymies operating in the Auxiliary system， we have two conceptual metonymies： （a） PRESENT FOR HABITUAL，（b） PRESENT FOR FUTURE.

Event ICM can also subsume Panther and Thornburgs metonymy POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY. Look at the examples below：

（1） Our teacher is an angry person.

（2） I can see the distant lake from the top of the mountain.

The present tense in （1） does not mean that the teacher is angry at the present moment but that he or she has a disposition to get angry potentially. This is a case of the metonymy ACTUAL FOR POTENTILAL. Sentence （2） highlights the precondition of ability for the Whole event ‘see， which is consonant with the metonymy POTENTIALFORACTURAL.

4.1.5Category-and-Member ICM

Every category and its members possess a metonymic relation. We believe that “each higher-order category is a whole， with the immediately lower categories being its parts” （Lakoff， 1987：287）. Thus we have two kinds of metonymies： （a） CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY： the pill for ‘the birth control pill； （b） MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY： aspirin for ‘any pain-relieving tablet. This Category-and-Member ICM can invoke a special case of metonymic relationship between a generic type and a specific token. For example： （1） Boys dont cry. （2） The/ A spider has eight legs. The sentence （1） is a generic statement about boys， but it might be used in a specific situation of a boys crying. Conversely， specific tokens may be used to stand for generic types. In sentence （2）， the definite article the or the indefinite article a is used to refer to spiders in general， on which Norrick （1981：35） has a comment， “any specific instantiation of a class calls forth the whole class.”

4.1.6Category-and-Property ICM

Properties may either be seen metaphorically as possessed objects （PROPERTIES ARE POSSESSED） or metonymically as parts of object. If categories are intentionally defined by a set of properties， these properties are necessarily part of the category. Categories typically evoke， and metonymically stand for， one of their defining or otherwise essential properties and， conversely， a defining or essential property may evoke， or stand for， the category if defines. Thus we have two kinds of metonymies： （a） CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY： jerk for‘stupidity； （b）

DEFINING PROPERTY FOR CATEGORY： blacks for‘black people. Usually a category possesses a lot of properties； the most prototypical properties are used to stand for the whole ICM. Also in the most cases， people often pick the most salient feature out of the defining properties to stand for the whole category， and that salient features are stereotypical properties in the category which is fully exemplified in tautologies such as Boys are boys.

4.2 Parts of an ICM

There is no doubt that parts in the who1e ICM have metonymic relationships among themselves. While the relationship between a whole and its parts typically applies to things as we have discussed above，the relationship between parts typically applies to entities within an event. Events are constituted by relations and participants，and PART FOR PART metonymies tend to build on the interaction between a relation and one of the things participating in the relation. Metonymy also arises when a relation is construed as a thing or a thing is construed as a relation. In English，such conceptual recategorizations are coded morphologically： relations which are recategorized as things turn out to be derived nominals，such as production，and things which are recategorized as relations turn out to be derived verbs，e.g. to beautify or without a derivational morpheme，as conversions，e.g. to author.

The part-part configuration applies to various parts of ICMs and includes the Action ICM， the perception ICM， the Causation ICM， the Production ICM， the Control ICM， the Possession ICM， the Containment ICM， the Location ICM， the Sign and Reference ICMs and the Modification ICM. We will briefly introduce them as follows.

4.2.1 Action ICM

Action ICMs involve a variety of participants that may be related to predicate expressing the action or to each other. There are specific relationships such as those between an INSTRUMENT and the ACTION， the RESULT of an action and the ACTION， et.， all of which are parts of the ACTION ICM. These relationships are instantiated as specific types of metonymy， such as AGENT FOR ACTION： to author a new book； INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION： to ski，to hammer； OBJECT FOR ACTION ：to blanket the bed，to dust the room； RESULT FOR ACTION： to landscape the garden； MANNER FOR ACTION： to tiptoe into the room； TIME FOR ACTION： to summer in Paris； DESTINATION FOR MOTION： to porch the newspaper； INSTRUMENT FOR AGENT： the pen for the ‘writer.

The metonymic relationships listed above are typically achieved by word-class change， in particular， noun-verb conversion. Noun-verb conversion and nominalization are two common language phenomena； they are two complementary morphological processes motivated by metonymic mechanism i. e. grammatical metonymy.

4.2.2 Perception ICM

Perception has a very close relation with cognition， in this sense， we may say that perception merits an ICM of its own in the cognitive process. Perceptions may be intentional and unintentional. If intentional， the perception ICM may cross-classify with the ACTION ICM. This applies to the metonymies INSTRIJMENT/ ORGAN OF PERCEPTION FOR THE PERCEPTION as in to eye someone and MANNOR OF PERCEPTION FOR THE PERCEPTION as in She squinted through the mailbox. If unintentional， the perception ICM may produce the metonymies THING PERCEIVED FOR PERCEPTION as in There goes my knee for ‘there goes the pain in my knee and PERCEPTION FOR THING PERCEIVED as in sight for ‘thing seen.

4.2.3 Causation ICM

Cause and effect play an outstanding part in the Event ICM， they are so closely interdependent that one of them can easily evoke the other. The Causation ICM may produce two reversible metonymies： （a） CAUSE FOR EFFECT as in She has a healthy complexion and （b） EFFECT FOR CAUSE as in We are late for work this morning due to the slow road.

The metonymic expressions ‘healthy complexion and ‘slow road are generated by Causation ICM. Healthy complexion stands for ‘the good state of health bringing about the effect of healthy complexion， while low road metonymically stands for ‘slow traffic resulting from the poor state of the road.

Cause and effect can be used to stand for each other， but in daily communication， there is a clear preference for choosing the effects as the vehicle rather than causes， such as She was my ruin for‘she was the cause of my ruin，She is my joy for‘she makes me be happy，You are a pain in the neck for‘you give me pain，She was upset for‘something made her upset.

A causal metonymy may also be seen in situations in which an action or a motion brings about， or is accompanied by， typical sounds which together establish an ICM， occurring in SOUND FOR EVENT CAUSING IT. For example， whistling， wailing and screeching noises are the results of some objects action， as in The train whistled into the station； The fire trucks wailed out of the firehouse； The car screeched to a halt.

4.2.4 Production ICM

Production ICMS involve actions n which one of the Participants is a product created by the action. The production of objects seems to be a particularly salient type of causal action. The Production ICM is so productive that it can lead to various types of metonymic relationships， among which metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT may be the most representative. For example， We have spent the whole night reading Shakespeare. Shakespeare stands for ‘the works written by Shakespeare. Specifically speaking， this metonymic expression is generated by the metonymy ARTIST FOR HIS WORK，which is a subtype of the conceptual metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT.

4.2.5 Control ICM

Control ICM includes a controller and a person or object controlled. It fives rise to reversible metonymic relationships：

（a） CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED：

Bush defeated Saddam.

（b） CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER：

The Mercedes has arrived.

Control ICMs seem to be naturally expressed by using the CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED metonymy as in （a）， in which Bush stands for the US Army that did the fighting， while Saddam stands for the Iraq. Making the same statement using the CONTROLLED instead of the CONTROLLER， as in The US Army defeated Iraq， does not evoke the controller reading. The CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER metonymy seems to apply only to situations in which the thing controlled is particularly salient or the controller is unknown.

4.2.6 Possession ICM

The notion of possession blends into that of control， since the user of an object is at the same time in control of the object used and possesses it. The Possession ICM can lead to two reversible metonymies： （a） POSSESSOR FOR POSSESSED： Thats me for ‘my car； （b） POSSESSED FOR POSSESSOR： He married money for ‘person with money.

After analyzing the data， we find that possessor more readily serves as the vehicle than a possessed object. The POSSESS0R FOR POSSESSED metonymy is well-entrenched and hardly noticeable. It is no exaggeration to say that it permeates our daily communication. For example： I am parked over there （for‘my car），You have a flat tire （for‘your car），I am not in the phone book （for‘my name）. This is also reflected in the use of anaphoric pronouns， which， if they can be used at all， refer to human vehicle.

4.2.7 Containment ICM

The Containment ICM is one of the most basic image schemas in human cognition. In this sense， the image-schematic situation of containment merits an ICM of its own among locational relations. The Containment ICM leads to two reversible metonymies： （a） CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS： The bottle is sour for ‘milk； （b） CONTENTS FOR CONTAINER： The milk tipped over for ‘the mild container tipped over”.

4.2.8 Location ICMs

Places are stereotypically associated with people living there， well-known institutions located there， events which occur or occurred there and goods produced or shipped from there. Location ICMs can lead to many pairs of reversible metonymies：

（1） a. PLACE FOR INHABITANTS

The whole school went to the gate to welcome the delegation.

b. INHABITANTS FOR PLACE

The French hosted the World Cup Soccer Games.

（2） a. PLACE FOR INSTITUTION

Washington did not make any comment on the accident.

b. INSTITLJTION FOR PLACE

I live close to the University.

（3） a. PLACE FOR EVENT

Waterloo for‘battle fought at Waterloo，

b. EVENT FOR PLACE

Battle，name of the village in East Sussex where the Battle of Hastings was fought.Places have stereotypical relationships with the inhabitants， institutions or events. Our cultural knowledge allows us to associate place with people living or working there， with what is typically done there， etc.， which can be illustrated by a very common metonymy PLACE FOR ACTIVITY PERFORMED AT THAT PLACE.

5. Conclusion

The present paper gives a comparatively systemic classification of metonymy based on Lakoffs ICM theory， through which a better and through understanding of metonymys nature， operating principles， and its functions can be obtained. Classifying metonymy along two high-level conceptual configurations， whole ICM and its parts and parts of an ICM， can facilitate linguistic analysis of conceptual metonymy in depth. Meanwhile， this paper also discusses cognitive motivations in using metonymy namely human experience and perceptive salience， which actually work simultaneously and interactively in majority situations. Dirven & Vespoor （1998：2） point out that， people tend to give priority to human beings when describing events. It is no doubt that humans basic experience originates from interaction between human and the world， and we try to understand the world form our own perspectives. When this subjective experiential view reflected in metonymic way of thinking， there exists a tendency to understand events or concepts， which are inanimate abstract， having no using functions and interactive relation with human beings， via concepts or events that are animate specific， having using functions and interactively relation with human beings.

Perspective salience means that our perceptual organs have preferences for those events or entities that are direct， existed， and prominent， with gestalt structure and clear category boundaries. As a result， events and things with the above characteristics are prone to be the conventional prototypical vehicle， the mental access to which we are able to perceive， understand and talk about those indirect， secondary events with less clear boundaries i.e. the tenor.

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